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TITLE TO SUE AT THE DAWNING OF THE SEA TRANSPORT
DOCUMENTS ACT, NO 65 OF 2000:
A Comparative Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Bills of lading are documents of great importance in international transactions relating to the
carriage of goods by sea. They have over centuries developed from mere receipts for goods
on board vessels to complex documents of title with which ownership of goods can be
transferred. Current South African law relating to bills of lading has been described as
inadequate and out of date.1 The Sea Transport Documents Act, No. 65 of 2000, signed by
the South African State President on 5 December 2000, was drafted in an effort to address
those areas in the law left wanting in respect of bills of lading. The Act functions to, inter
alia, regulate the transfer of rights of suit under a contract of carriage from the shipper to the
lawful holder of a bill of lading. The Sea Transport Documents Act is currently however of
no force and effect. In order to become law, its provisions and effective date are required to
be made known to the public by way of publication in the Government Gazette.
This study shall focus on the rights embodied in the traditional bill of lading as a document of
title as well as modern sea transport documents which have emerged as alternatives to the bill
of lading. More particularly, it shall concentrate on the transfer of the rights of suit in such
documents to those who are not parties to the original contracts of carriage. It shall consider
current South African law on title to sue and furthermore, the developments in England that
led to the enactment of the United Kingdom Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1992 which in
turn served as the impetus for reform in South Africa and the drafting of the Sea Transport
Documents Act. A comparative analysis of the two Acts shall therefore be drawn with a view
to establishing the extent of the progress made in this particular field of law.
                                                
1 See Government Gazette No.18541 of 12 December 1997 Draft Sea Transport Documents Bill -
Invitation to Comment.
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2. THE BILL OF LADING AS A DOCUMENT OF TITLE
The role played by the bill of lading in the international carriage of goods by sea has since the
earliest recordings of its use in the fourteenth century been a vital one. The demands of
mercantile custom have resulted in the transformation of the bill of lading from the mere
receipt of goods for which it was first used into the modern, complex ‘document of dignity’2
which today functions as evidence of the contract of carriage as well as a document of title
with which rights in the goods that it represents may be transferred.3
The description of the bill of lading as a ‘document of title’ has always been problematic to
the extent that although the bill has come to symbolize the goods described in it, it does not
necessarily transfer ownership of the cargo when it is transferred from the shipper to the
consignee.4 There is little agreement as to what constitutes a document of title. Scrutton
describes a ‘document of title’ as a document ‘by indorsement of which the property in the
goods for which it is a receipt may be transferred, or the goods pledged or mortgaged’.5 Hare6
suggests that the expression ‘document of title’ may be too broad a description because a bill
of lading more accurately evidences the right of possession to the cargo and not necessarily
ownership thereof. Carver7 similarly places an emphasis on the right of the holder of the bill
of lading to demand possession of the goods and similarly to transfer that right.8 Whether the
transfer of the bill of lading will result in the transfer of rights of ownership is dependent
                                                
2 See Hare Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa Juta & Co, 1999 at 540 fn 1
where the author quotes the following extract from the decision in The Carso 1930 AMC 1743 at
1758:
‘A bill of lading is a document of dignity, and the courts should do everything in
their power preserve its integrity in international trade for there, especially,
confidence is of the essence’.
3 For more information regarding the historical development of the bill of lading see Hare, op cit at
540 – 542; Carol Proctor The Legal Role of the Bill of Lading, Sea Waybill and Multimodal
Transport Document Interlegal, 1997 at 18;
4 NJJ Gaskell C Debattista and RJS Swatton Chorley and Giles' Shipping Law 8th Edition Pitman,
1988 at 251; Proctor, op cit at 55; Hare, op cit at 550; Gaskell Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts
LLP, 2000 at 118; Halsbury's Laws of England Butterworths Vol. 43(2).- 1 May 1997 at para
1534.
5 Scrutton Chartertparties & Bills of Lading (19th Edition), Sweet & Maxwell, 1984 at 1.
6 See Hare, op cit at 550.
7 Carver Carriage by Sea (13th Edition), Stevens, 1982 at 1113.
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upon the underlying intentions of the parties which may appear from the terms and conditions
of the purchase and sale contract.9 In terms of South African law, delivery of possession with
the animus possidendi is a prerequisite for passing ownership of goods.10 See, for example,
the case of The Mariannina,11 where the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the shipper
must relinquish its animus possidendi in favour of the indorsee in order for the shipper to
divest itself of possession of the goods through the indorsement of a bill of lading.
The English Court of Appeal in The Delfini12, provides a useful explanation of the meaning of
‘document of title’ when it is applied in relation to bills of lading:
‘it does not in this context bear its ordinary meaning. It signifies that in addition to its
other characteristics as receipt for the goods and as evidence of the contract of
carriage between the shipper and the shipowner, the bill of lading fulfills two distinct
functions. 1. It is a symbol of constructive possession of the goods which (unlike
many such symbols) can transfer constructive possession by indorsement and
transfer: it is a transferable ‘key to the warehouse’. 2. It is a document which,
although not itself capable of directly transferring the property in the goods which it
represents, merely by indorsement and delivery, nevertheless is capable of being part
of the mechanism by which property is passed’(inserted).13
Similarly, the use of the expression ‘negotiability’ in the context of bills of lading should also
be applied with caution.14 Although often described as ‘negotiable’, a bill of lading is not
strictly speaking a negotiable instrument primarily because the transferee in good faith does
                                                                                                                                                
8 See Wilde International Transactions, The Law Book Company, 1993 at 97 where the author
comments that Carver ‘is probably more correct in placing the emphasis on the bill of lading as a
symbol of the goods which enables a transfer of possession’.
9 Tetley Marine Cargo Claims Third Edition, Blais, 1988 at 220. See also Hare, op cit at 550 and
Gaskell, op cit at 118.
10 See Hare, op cit at 550.
11 The Mariannina 1976 (4) SA 464 (SCA).
12 The Delfini [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 252.
13 The Delfini [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 252 at 268.
14 See Gaskell, op cit at 118.
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not acquire better title than the transferor.15 This position accords with the view of the House
of Lords in Lickbarrow v Mason,16 which held the following:
‘It has never been decided that a bill of lading is a negotiable instrument, but
merely assignable, and therefore an indorsement or assignment of such bill of
lading cannot convey to the indorsee or assignee thereof, greater rights or
property in the goods to which the bill relates, than the original possessor or
indorser of such bill had: and the right or property of the original holder or
consignee of the bill in the goods to which it relates, being the subject to the
rights of the vendor to stop such goods in transitu, it follows that the right or
property of the assignee or indorsee of such bill of lading, must also be subject
to the same right’.
Carver similarly makes the following comment:
'Mere possession does not enable the holder to give any title to the goods to a
transferee; even though he may himself have shipped the goods, and obtained
the bill of lading from the shipper. His power to convey a title to the goods by
means of the bill of lading is no greater than it would be if the goods
themselves were in his possession. The document is not a negotiable
instrument, or a document of title, in the sense of carrying title with it, even to
a buyer who may take it honestly and give full value for it'.17
A bill of lading is therefore ‘negotiable’ to the extent that it is transferable.18 The
transferability of a bill will be determined by the manner or form in which it is issued. A bill
of lading issued ‘to order or assigns’ of the shipper is transferable by simply naming the
consignee or, where it is issued to a named consignee ‘or his order’, by indorsement. 19 A
bearer bill is similarly a transferable ‘document of title’. A straight bill of lading issued to a
named consignee without the words ‘or order’ lacks transferability and as such merely
functions as a non-negotiable receipt issued by the carrier in terms of which it acknowledges
                                                
15 This is confirmed by FR Malan in Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques & Promissory Notes (2nd
Edition), Butterworths, 1994 at 10 where the author states that:
‘A bill of lading is not a negotiable instrument but does constitute commercial paper
because the exercise of the rights evidenced by it generally presupposes possession’.
See also Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Efroiken and Newman 1924 AD 171 at 189;
Proctor, op cit at 72; Hare, op cit at 552; Wilson, op cit at 97; Carver, op cit at para 1599.
16 Lickbarrow v Mason [1793] 4 Brown PC 57.
17 Carver, op cit at par 1599.
18 See Hare, op cit at 552; Gaskell, op cit at 118; Proctor, op cit at 72.
19 See Hare, op cit at 553; Proctor at 63; Gaskell, op cit at 118; Wilson Carriage of Goods by Sea
(3rd Edition), Pitman Publishing, 1998. See Halsbury's, op cit at par 1552.
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receipt of the goods into its charge.20 The further transfer of a bill of lading may also be
limited by the form in which it is indorsed.21
A transferable bill of lading will continue to enjoy its status as a means of transferring be it
ownership or possession until the contract of carriage is discharged by the delivery of the
cargo against the bill of lading.22 A bill of lading therefore ceases to be transferable once it is
accepted by carrier against delivery of the cargo described therein.
In terms of South African common law, the principle of clavium traditio is broad enough to
accommodate the delivery of a bill of lading as a symbol of the goods therein described.23 As
held in The Mariannina:
'The holder of the bill, ie, the person in whose favour it was originally made out
or the indorsee thereof, is entitled, to the exclusion of others, to receive the goods
from the ship at the place of destination. He is thus in the same commercial
position as if he were in physical possession of the goods. The bill of lading is,
accordingly, recognized as a symbol of the goods and the transfer of the bill is
regarded as a form of symbolical delivery'.24
The ability of the bill of lading to function as a document of title is of importance to this
study particularly in relation to the rights which are thereby transferred from the shipper to
the consignee or indorsee. The manner in which these rights are protected under South
African and English law shall be discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.
3. CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN LAW ON TITLE TO SUE
South African law and more particularly its shipping and admiralty law, is as colourful and
complex as is the country's history. Its roots may be traced back in time to the arrival of the
Dutch in 1652 and the implementation of the Dutch civilian law system, primarily the laws of
                                                
20 See Proctor, op cit at 64; Hare, op cit at 553; Halsbury's, op cit at par 1552.
21 See Halsbury's, op cit at par 1552.
22 See Proctor, op cit at 77 and Hare, op cit at 551.
23 See Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd Edition), Butterworths, 1994 at 398; Kleyn
and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (3rd Edition), Butterworths, 1992.at
258; Hare, op cit at 553; LAWSA Vol 27 at par 171. See also Standard Bank v Efroiken and
Newman 1924 AD 171 at 190; The Mariannina 1976 (4) SA 464 (A).
24 The Mariannina 1976 (4) SA 464 (A) at 491 - 492.
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Holland. A developed European law with strong Dutch maritime influence became the order
of the day.
The turn of the nineteenth century saw the collapse of Dutch rule in the Cape and the advent
of British occupation; with it the implementation of the English common law system.25 The
colonization of the Cape in 1815 resulted in the establishment of the first Cape Supreme
Court in 1827 presided over by three British judges. The Supreme Court was required to
apply 'the laws now in force within our said colony, and all other laws as shall at any time
hereafter be made'.26 As a result, Roman-Dutch law stood its ground but as can be expected,
did not go uninfluenced by English court procedure and practice.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Courts became Colonial Courts of
Admiralty by virtue of the provisions of the English Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of
189027 ("the 1890 Act") which was enacted 'to amend the Law respecting the exercise of the
Admiralty Jurisdiction in Her majesty's Dominions and elsewhere out of the United
Kingdom'.28 Section 2(2) of this Act provides that:
'The jurisdiction of a Colonial Court of Admiralty shall, subject to the provisions
of this Act, be over like places, persons, matters, and things, as the Admiralty
jurisdiction of the High court of England, whether existing by virtue of any
statute or otherwise, and the Colonial Court of Admiralty may exercise such
jurisdiction in like manner and to as full an extent as the High Court in England,
and shall have the same regard as that court to international law and the comity
of nations.'
Furthermore,
'Any enactment in an Act of the Imperial Parliament referring to the admiralty
jurisdiction of the High Court in England, when applied to a Colonial Court of
Admiralty in a British Posssession, shall be read as if the name of that possession
were therein substituted for England and Wales.'
The South African Supreme Court, by 1890, became a Colonial Court of Admiralty thereby
confirming nineteenth century English Admiralty law to be a part of the law administered in
the Cape and Natal as British possessions.
                                                
25 The first British occupation was in 1795; the second, in 1806.
26 De Wet Die Ou Skrywers in Perspectief (1988) at 33.
27 Came into force on 1 July 1891.
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South Africa lost its colonial status with the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910.
It nevertheless remained a part of the British Empire until it became a Republic in 1961.
Roman-Dutch law remained in place throughout this period of political change and continues
to prevail today.
3.1 The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, No 105 of 1983
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act of 1983 ("AJRA") came into operation in South Africa
on 1 November 1983 and provided for:
'the vesting of the powers of the admiralty courts of the Republic in the
provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court29 of South Africa, and for the
extension of those powers; for the law to be applied by, and the procedure
applicable in, those divisions ...'.30
Section 2 of this Act imbues the South African High court with admiralty jurisdiction to
'hear and determine any maritime claim, irrespective of the place where it arose,
of the place of registration of the ship concerned or of the residence, domicile or
nationality of its owner'.
The doors of the High Court in Admiralty are therefore open to all claimants, be they foreign
or South African nationals, who have a maritime claim. Section 1 of AJRA defines a
maritime claim as 'any claim for, arising out of or relating to' various causes of action which
are clearly listed in subsections (a) - (ff).31
The complainant must therefore allege a maritime claim to invoke the High Court's admiralty
jurisdiction. Particularly in the case of a consignee or indorsee of a bill of lading seeking to
                                                                                                                                                
28 As per the preamble of the 1890 Act.
29 The South African Supreme Court was renamed as the High Court in 1996.
30 As per the preamble of AJRA.
31 The court in The Cargo ex General Santos 1988 (3) SA 903 (D) described this list of maritime
claims as a numerus clausus weakened substantially by the catch-all provisions of subsections (dd)
and (ee). Subsection (dd) preserves the colonial admiralty jurisdiction in respect of 'any matter not
falling under any of the previous paragraphs' of section 1 and (ee), more generally, provides for:
'any other matter which by virtue of its nature or subject matter is a marine or
maritime matter, the meaning of the expression marine or maritime matter not being
limited by reason of the matters set forth in the preceding paragraphs (of AJRA
section 1)'(inserted).
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enforce its claim in admiralty against the carrier for damage to or loss of cargo or, for that
matter, the carrier who wishes to sue for outstanding freight, the following 'maritime claims'
may be relied upon:
'(e) damage caused by or to a ship, whether by collision or otherwise;
(g) loss of or damage to goods (including baggage and the personal belongings
of the master, officers or seamen of a ship) carried or which ought to have
been carried in a ship, whether such claim arises out of agreement or
otherwise;
(h) the carriage of goods in ship, or any agreement for or relating to such
carriage;
(i) any container and any agreement relating to any container;
(j) any charterparty or the use, hire, employment or operation of a ship,
whether such a claim arises out of any agreement or otherwise.'
It is clear from the above that South African admiralty jurisdiction is wide enough to
encompass all cargo claims including those of disgruntled consignees and/or indorsees.
Having invoked the admiralty jurisdiction of the South African court, it becomes important to
determine the law applicable to dispute, more particularly the consignee’s title to sue under
the contract of carriage. Section 6 of AJRA determines the law to be applied to admiralty
matters in South Africa. It provides that:
‘6(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law
contained a court in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction shall-
(a) with regard to any matter in respect of which a court of admiralty of
the Republic referred to in the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890,
of the United Kingdom, had jurisdiction immediately before the
commencement of this Act, apply the law which the High Court of
Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise of its admiralty
jurisdiction would have applied with regard to such a matter at such
commencement, in so far as that law can be applied;
(b) with regard to any other matter, apply the Roman-Dutch law applicable
in the Republic.
(2) the provisions of subsection (1) shall not derogate from the provisions of any
law of the Republic applicable to any of the matters contemplated in
paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection;
...
(5) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not supersede any agreement relating
to the system of law to be applied in the event of a dispute'.
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More simply put, the South African High Court in Admiralty will first apply mandatory
South African statute law if appropriate in the circumstances; then give effect to the disputing
parties' choice of law, if such a clause exists by virtue of an agreement between them. Where
the matter is one in respect of which the Colonial Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction, so-
called old jurisdiction,32 English law as at 1 November 1983 (at the commencement of
AJRA) shall apply. And where the jurisdiction is new, Roman-Dutch common law applies.33
3.2 English Law as at 1 November 1983
The jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty remained prescribed by the 1890 Act.34
Section 6(1)(a) has the effect of directing the South African maritime lawyer to investigate
and unravel the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court as it was in 1891, which task has
been described as a ‘mammoth’ one.35
Section 2(2) of the 1890 Act provides that the Colonial Court shall have jurisdiction over 'like
places, persons, matters, and things, as the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in
England, whether existing by virtue of any statute or otherwise'.
The Admiralty Courts Acts of 1840 and 1861 are two of a number of pre-existing statutes
referred to in section 2(2).36 'Otherwise' in that section,37 refers to the pre-existing, inherent
jurisdiction of the English High Court and its predecessor, the Admiralty Court, which court's
jurisdiction and practice the 1840 and 1890 Acts sought to 'improve' and 'extend'.38 English
case law between 1891 and 1983 is therefore also directly applicable in South Africa.39
                                                
32 See Hare, op cit at 18.
33 See Hare, op cit at 18, and at 25 for a comprehensive list of claims subject to old English
jurisdiction and those subject to new South African jurisdiction.
34 The Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, which came into effect on 1 July 1891.
35 See Hare, op cit at 22.
36 See Hare, op cit at 19, more particularly fn 92, where the writer gives numerous examples of other
pre-existing statutes.
37 See discussion on page 6 above.
38 As per the Preambles of both the 1840 and the 1861 Acts.
39 See Hare, op cit at 22.
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3.3 The Law Applicable to Bill of Lading Disputes
Section 6 of the 1861 Act provides that:
'Any claim by the owner or consignee or assignee of any bill of lading of any goods
carried into any port in England ... for damage done to the goods or any part thereof
by the negligence or misconduct of or for any breach of duty or breach of contract
on the part of the Owner, Master or Crew of the ship, unless it is shown to the
satisfaction of the Court that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or
part owner of the ship is domiciled in England'.
By virtue of this provision, the Colonial Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, in the South African
context, is limited to cargo claims for goods carried under bills of lading into South Africa by
a foreign ship.40 Hare indicates that section 16 of the 1861 Act limits the Colonial Court’s
admiralty jurisdiction to carrier’s claims for unpaid freight in respect of cargo carried into
South Africa.41 Claims in relation to non-bill of lading consignments such as sea waybills,
non-negotiable receipts or charterparties concluded in England or any cargo carried under
bills of lading into South Africa by a South African ship or cargo carried into another country
shall, as a consequence of section 6 of AJRA, be subject to Roman Dutch law.42
The impractical, arbitrary effect of section 6 of AJRA where, inter alia, the nationality of a
shipowner dictates the law to be applied in South Africa is by no means satisfactory nor does
it promote legal certainty.
                                                
40 See Hare, op cit at 25.
41 See Hare, op cit at 26.
42 See Hare, op cit at 26. Under Roman Dutch law, the bill of lading is described as a cognoscement
or acknowledgment and is described by van der Linden as follows:
‘The master gives the shipper a written acknowledgement of the goods loaded on board,
containing a statement of the goods, their quantity, marks and numbers, the place of
destination, the name of the freighter and often also the consignee and the freight
stipulated for’.42
See further Hare, op cit at 542 where the author doubts whether the application of Roman Dutch
law, as opposed to English law, would produce different results if one takes into consideration the
fact that modern law relating to bills of lading developed predominantly in England and has been
applied extensively in a number of South African carriage of goods cases. See for example The
Dien Danielson 1982 (3) SA 534 (N).
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3.4 The Bills of Lading Act, 1855
The Bills of Lading Act, 1855 ("the 1855 Act") was still a part of English law at 1 November
1983 and, by virtue of section 6 of AJRA, applies in South Africa to very limited heads of
jurisdiction.43 The main purpose of this Act is to transfer to the consignee or indorsee of a bill
of lading the shipper's rights of suit against the carrier.44
Prior to the enactment of the 1855 Act, commercial difficulties arose where a third party
cargo receiver suffered loss or damage at the hands of the carrier. Because of the well
established English common law principle of privity of contract that only parties to a contract
may sue or be sued on its terms, a transferee such as a consignee or indorsee had no rights of
recourse against the carrier for such loss.
In The Sophia Moffat45, Maule, J in casu denied an indorsee the right to sue the carrier for the
loss of a shipment of 27 casks of cochineal which was carried under a bill of lading and stated
emphatically that 'a contract cannot be transferred so as to enable the transferee to sue upon
it'.46
The 1855 Act was therefore enacted to overcome the difficulties faced by the buyer of a bill
of lading. Section 1 of the 1855 Act provides the following:
'Every consignee named in a bill of lading, and every indorsee of a bill of lading
to whom the property in the goods mentioned shall pass upon or by reason of
such consignment or indorsement, shall have transferred to and vested in him all
rights of suit, and be subject to the same liabilities in respect of such goods as if
the contract contained in the bill of lading had been made with him.'
Section 1 creates a statutory exception to the doctrine of privity of contract by transferring to
the consignee or indorsee the shipper’s rights of suit ‘as if the contract contained in the bill of
lading had been made with him’. However, the transfer of rights shall only take place in
instances where ‘property’ (ownership) in the goods passes ‘upon or by reason of the
consignment or indorsement’. In effect, a causal link is established between the transfer of
contractual rights of suit and the transfer of 'property' in the goods. The wording of this
                                                
43 See Hare, op cit at 519.
44 See Hare, op cit at 519.
45 The Sophia Moffat: Howard v Shepherd 137 ER 907.
46 See Hare, op cit at 519.
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section was only a partial solution to the title to sue problem as will be discussed in more
detail below.
Section 1 operates differently in respect of the shipper's liabilities. It provides for the
consignee or indorsee to be 'subject to the same liabilities' as the shipper. The shipper may
not avoid liability on the bill of lading where his rights of suit have been transferred. This
position was confirmed in the recent English decision of The Giannis NK.47 The House of
Lords ruled:
'Whereas the rights under the contract of carriage were to be transferred, the
liabilities were not. The shippers were to remain liable, but the holder of the bill
of lading was to come under the same liability as the shipper. His liability was to
be by way of addition, not substitution.'
Due to the fact that The Giannis NK is a post 1 November 1983 decision, Hare is of the
opinion that later decisions may be persuasive to the extent that they amend earlier decisions
on the basis of them being wrongly expounded at the time.48
Section 2 of the 1855 Act expressly preserves the carrier's right to claim freight and the
shipper’s right of stoppage in transitu.49
Section 3 of the 1855 Act provides:
'Every bill of lading in the hands of a consignee or indorsee for valuable
consideration, representing goods to have been shipped on board a vessel, shall
be conclusive evidence of such shipment as against the master or other person
signing same, notwithstanding that such goods or some part thereof may not have
been so shipped, unless such a holder of the bill of lading shall have had actual
notice at the time of receiving the same that the goods had not been in fact laden
on board: Provided , that the master or other person so signing may exonerate
himself in respect of such misrepresentation by showing that it was caused
without the default on his part, and wholly by the fraud of the shipper, or of the
holder, or some person under whom the holder claims.'
This provision creates a statutory estoppel in favour of the consignee or indorsee but only as
against the master or 'other persons signing the same'. Section 3 effectively makes the bill of
lading conclusive evidence against the signatory of the bill who was often the duly authorized
                                                
47 The Giannis NK [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 337 (HL). See Hare, op cit at 521.
48 See Hare, op cit at 23.
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master who seldom contracted in his personal capacity and was often not worth suing. Its
application again very limited and ineffective as against the principle established in Grant v
Norway50 in which it was decided that the Master had no authority to sign for goods not
actually shipped at the time the bill of lading was issued.51
The provisions of the 1855 Act were partially effective to the extent that consignees or
indorsees of bills of lading went unprotected as against the carrier in instances where they did
not acquire ownership ‘upon or by reason of such consignment or indorsement’. In Scruttons
Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd,52 the House of Lords decided against stevedores who sought to
rely on limitation provisions in a contract of carriage to which they were not a party on the
basis that it is a fundamental principle of English law that only parties to a contract may sue
on its terms.53 In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd54 the court confirmed
that English law ‘knows nothing of a jus quasitum tertio arising by way of contract’.55 In the
circumstances, it is quite clear that English law has difficulty in recognizing the rights of
parties extraneous to contracts. It similarly finds difficulty in recognizing the assignment of
rights of action in instances where the consignee buyer is not only reliant upon the shipper's
co-operation but is also required to give notice to the carrier on each assignment56 which
becomes extremely impractical in a long line of sales involving a chain of buyers from
around the globe.57
Roman Dutch law does not experience the same technical difficulty as English law in that it
will recognise a contract in favour of a third party, commonly known as a stipulatio alteri.58
A stipulatio alteri is a form of agency in terms of which a shipper can be regarded
retrospectively as having acted for the third party consignee, but only once the latter has
                                                                                                                                                
49 See Hare, op cit at 521.
50 Grant v Norway [1851] 20 LJCP 93.
51 See Hare, op cit at 544.
52 Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 1.
53 Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 1 at 6. See Hare, op cit at 554 and Gaskell
Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts LLP, 2000 at 389.
54 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847.
55 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847 at 853. See Hare,op cit at
554.
56 See section 136 of the English Law of Property Act, 1925.
57 See Beatson & Cooper, Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods Sea (1990) LMCLQ 196 at
198. See also Government Gazette No.18541 of 12 December 1997 Draft Sea Transport
Documents Bill - Invitation to Comment at 2.
58 Van der Merwe, van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe & Lotz Contract: General Principles Juta & Co
Ltd, 1993 at 186. See Hare, op cit at 555.
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accepted the benefits of the bill of lading.59 The shipper should under a stipulatio alteri fall
out of the picture which is not the case in bill of lading transactions where the shipper retains
rights and obligations.60 The stipulatio alteri is therefore not the complete solution to the title
to sue problem.61
The limited application of the 1855 Act became problematic in the face of modernized
shipping, especially with the increase of bulk cargo transport towards the end of the 20th
century. The practical implications and inadequacies thereof will be discussed in detail
below.
4. DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLAND SINCE 1983
Modernization of the shipping industry, the increase in the size of ships, their speed and the
advent of containerization has revolutionalised the carriage of goods by sea. Bulk cargoes are
commonly traded on highly competitive markets. The increased commercial use of non-
negotiable sea waybills, ship's delivery orders and electronic bills of lading, all documents to
which the Bills of Lading Act , 1855, did not apply, motivated the need for change of the
laws relating to bills of lading which had become outdated and inadequate.
4.1 Inadequacies of the Bills of Lading Act, 1855
The 1855 Act operated on the basis of 'property' in the goods covered by a bill of lading. The
shipper's rights of suit as against the carrier were transferred to the consignee or indorsee of a
bill of lading provided that 'property' in the goods passed upon or by reason of the
consignment or indorsement. A causal link between the passing of property and the
indorsement had to be established. The particularity in the wording of the Act has the result
that where indorsement takes place after delivery of the goods or where delivery has already
                                                
59 See Hare,op cit at 520 fn 207 and 555.
60 See Hare, op cit at 555.
61 See Hare, op cit at 555.
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been made to the consignee or indorsee but 'property' has yet to pass in accordance with an
underlying purchase and sale agreement, there is no transfer of rights of suit.
It became common practice for bills of lading to be indorsed to banks or other like
institutions as security for loans advanced for the purpose of financing the purchase of cargo.
As pledgees, banks had no intention of dealing with cargo offered as security nor acquiring
‘property’ in the cargo and could thereby avoid liability under section 1 of the 1855 Act. This
was the view of the court in Sewell v Burdick.62 In the words of Lord Selbourne L.C.,
'It would be strange if the Bills of Lading Act has made a person whose name has
never been upon the bill of lading and who (as between himself and the
shipowner) has never acted upon it, liable to an action by the shipowner upon a
contract to which he was never a party'.63
However, the position is different where the pledgee-bank, in an effort to protect its interests,
deals with the cargo by making payment of all oustanding freight and takes delivery thereof.
In these circumstances the court will imply a contract of carriage between the pledgee and the
shipowner, thereby entitling the pledgee-bank to sue on the bill of lading. This near legal
fiction was the result of the Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co.
Ltd64 decision. In casu, Brandt financed the purchase of the goods against taking possession
of the bills of lading as security. In order to protect its interest, Brandt presented the bills of
lading to the carrier on discharge, paid all outstanding freight and took delivery of the goods.
The Court of Appeal decided that an implied contract was created between Brandt and the
shipowners, with the result that Brandt could sue the shipowners for breach of the bill of
lading contract.
The bulk cargo trade suffered particularly at the hands of the 1855 Act for it too fell prey to
both the notion of 'property' and section 16 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979. Section 16
provides that where there is a contract for the sale of unascertainable goods (like parts of bulk
cargo) no property in the goods is transferred unless and until the goods are ascertained. This
position was confirmed by the District Court at Rotterdam in The Gosforth.65 The Dutch court
                                                
62 Sewell v Burdick [1884] 10 App. Cas. 74 (H.L).
63 Sewell v Burdick [1884] 10 App. Cas. 74 (H.C.) at 83.
64 Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co. Ltd [1924] 1 K.B. 575.
65 S en S 1985 Nr. 981. See Davenport, Owners of Bulk Cargoes [1986] LMCLQ 4.
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decided the case according to English law66 and held that the buyers of parts of the bulk cargo
of citrus pellets to whom merchant's delivery orders were issued had no contract with the sea
carrier which would entitle them to assert any rights of delivery. This decision caused great
concern amongst commodity traders and subsequently prompted the Grain and Feed Trade
Association (GAFTA) to request an investigation of the law by the English Law Commission
of the rights of buyers of goods at sea which form part of a larger bulk.67
The decisions of The Delfini68 further exemplified the need for reform in England.
Indorsement of a bill of lading to a buyer after discharge of goods from a vessel left the buyer
unprotected as against the carrier under the 1855 Act. In The Delfini, the court of first
instance denied the final indorsees of a bill of lading their claim for short delivery against the
shipowners on the basis that the contract of carriage was discharged when the cargo was
unloaded. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment but for a different reason. Rights of suit
were transferred in terms of the 1855 Act to the indorsees only when 'property' in the goods
passed ‘upon or by reason of the indorsement’ and since property had passed before
indorsement and not by reason of it, their claim was rejected.
Further problems arose in The Aliakmon,69 where property did not pass at all because of the
reservation of the right of disposal and, in The Aramis,70 where there was no delivery under
one of the bills of lading and so no passing of property. The 1855 Act also does not apply to
documents other than a bill of lading such as a sea waybill which is used widely in container
transport, ship's delivery orders and paperless transactions by way of electronic data
interchange.
The original shipper, provided the holder of the bill of lading is able to identify him, may sue
for the transferee but he too faces the difficulty of having to prove loss of or damage to goods
which are no longer in his care. The indorsee or present holder of the bill may pursue its
claim against the carrier in tort (delict) in which case the carrier would have no recourse to
                                                
66 The pellets of citrus were sold on the terms of the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA)
which provide that English Law shall govern the contract.
67 See Pratter, Selected Bibliography on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1975 - 1992 Vol. 24, (1993)
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 181 at 184 where the sensation in the commodity trades
is said to have been caused by reason of the risk of the buyers being uninsurable.
68 The Delfini [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 252 (C.A.).
69 The Aliakmon [1986] AC 785.
70 The Aramis [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213.
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the terms of carriage originally agreed to with the shipper. The carrier itself may wish to
pursue a claim against the current bill of lading holder where the original shipper has
disappeared or gone into liquidation. However, where the bill of lading has been transferred
down a long line of buyers, there is no incentive for each transferee to assist the carrier in its
attempts with the result that it too is prejudiced by the operation of the 1855 Act.
Towards the end of the twentieth century, problems under the 1855 Act reached serious
proportions. On 19 March 1991, and in an effort to address the issues of an unsatisfied
mercantile community, the Law Commission published a report on Rights of Suit in Respect
of Carriage of Goods by Sea to which a draft Carriage of Goods by Sea Bill was appended.71
The report focused on the shortcomings of the 1855 Act and made recommendations for
reform of the then current law regulating the carriage of goods by sea. It did not recommend
any change to the Sale of Goods Act. The Law Commissioners' recommendations were fully
implemented and the United Kingdom Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1992, was enacted.
A subsequent enactment of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999,72 altered the
general law on privity of contract and the extent to which a third party may claim the benefits
of a contract.73 Section 6(5) –(7) however confers no general rights on third parties in relation
to contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, which includes contracts of carriage evidenced
by bills of lading, sea waybills and ship’s delivery orders or their corresponding electronic
transactions.74 The rationale behind the exclusion appears to the intention to avoid an overlap
with the provisions of the United Kingdom Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1992, which
shall be discussed in detail below.75
                                                
71 See Beatson & Cooper, Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods Sea (1990) LMCLQ 196
for greater insight on the principles of reform upon which the English Carriage of Goods by Sea
was based.
72 The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act came into force on 11 November 1999 but only
applies to contracts made after the lapse of six months from that date; ie. 11 May 2000.
73 See Gaskell, op cit at 27 and 380.
74 See Gaskell, op cit at 716.
75 See Gaskell, op cit at 381.
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5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: SEA TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS ACT 65 OF 200076
& UNITED KINGDOM CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT, 1992, (C. 50)
In light of recent developments in the shipping industry and in view of the enactment of the
United Kingdom Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1992, current South African maritime law on
the transfer of rights of suit from shipper to indorsee or consignee of a bill of lading, which
arguably still includes the partially effective provisions of the 1855 Act, is out of date and
inadequate. Motivated by the reform in the United Kingdom, the South African legislature
prepared a draft Sea Transport Documents Bill in an attempt to address issues left wanting in
the law as it stands today.
The South African Sea Transport Documents Act, No. 65 of 2000, was assented to by the
State President on 5 December 2000 and published in Government Gazette No. 21884 (Vol
426) of 13 December 2000; its purpose being ‘to regulate the position of certain documents
relating to the carriage of goods by sea; and to provide for incidental matters’. It comes into
operation on a date to be fixed by the President by proclamation in the Gazette.
By virtue of the operation of section 6(1) of AJRA, South African maritime law has to a large
extent developed parallel to English law. And, since the UK Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
1992, served as the starting point for the drafting of the Sea Transport Documents Act, 2000,
a comparative analysis shall be drawn between the provisions of the two Acts.
The United Kingdom Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1992, received royal assent on 16 July
1992 and came into force on 16 September 1992. The main purpose of this Act is to replace
the 1855 Act with new provision in respect of bills of lading and certain other shipping
documents.
As already mentioned in Chapter 4 above, the Law Commissions’ recommendations in Rights
of Suit77 (to which a draft Carriage of Goods by Sea Bill was annexed) were enacted in their
entirety. This report is an excellent source of information and provides for greater insight on
the principles of reform upon which the United Kingdom Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
                                                
76 This being the short title of the Sea Transport Documents and Title to Sue Act.
77 See Rights of Suit at 196.
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1992 is based. This Act is a relatively short piece of legislation, comprising of only six
sections; each of which shall be analysed in detail below.
For purposes of convenience, this work shall make reference to the Sea Transport Documents
Act as the STDA and, in order to avoid any confusion with its South African namesake, the
United Kingdom Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1992 and 1971, shall hereinafter be
referred to as the UK COGSA ’92 and ’71 respectively. Any reference to the ‘Act’ shall refer
to the statute under discussion in that particular section.
5.1 Transfer of Rights and Obligations
The provisions of the STDA and UK COGSA ’92 are novel to the extent that they both
provide for the statutory transfer of rights and/or obligations78 to the lawful holder of a bill of
lading regardless of whether property passed to him ‘upon or by reason of … consignment or
indorsement’.
5.1.1 Transfer of Rights and Obligations under UK COGSA 92
The UK COGSA ’92 separates the transfer of rights from the transfer of obligations. The
manner in which this is achieved as well as the purpose for doing so, shall be discussed in the
paragraphs to follow.
5.1.1.1 Section 2: Rights under Shipping Documents
The primary purpose for the enactment of the UK COGSA ’92, particularly in relation to bills
of lading, was to remove the connection between the passing of property and the transfer of
contractual rights. Described as the ‘key clause’,79 section 2(1) of this Act provides that:
‘2(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a person who
becomes-
(a) a lawful holder of a bill of lading;
                                                
78 “and/or” is used primarily because UK COGSA ’92 separates the transfer of rights and obligations
unlike the STDA which simultaneously provides for the transfer of rights and obligations-
distinction shall be dicscussed in more detail below.
79 See Rights of Suit at 202.
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(b) the person who (without being an original party to the contract of
carriage) is the person to whom delivery of the goods to which a sea
waybill relates is to be made by the carrier in accordance with that
contract; or
(c) the person to whom delivery of the goods to which a ship's delivery
order relates is to be made in accordance with the undertaking
contained in the order,
shall (by virtue of becoming the holder of the bill or, as the case may be,
the person to whom delivery is to be made) have transferred to and
vested in him all rights of suit under the contract of carriage as if he had
been a party to that contract’.80
In terms of section 2(1), the lawful holder of a bill of lading as well as the person entitled to
delivery under a sea waybill or a ship's delivery order may therefore assert contractual rights
of suit against the carrier.81 What constitutes a 'lawful holder' of a bill of lading shall be
discussed in paragraph 5.3.1 below. The transfer of rights in respect of sea waybills and ship's
delivery orders shall be discussed in more detail in paragraphs 5.6.3 and 5.6.2 respectively.
Section 1(2)(a) specifically provides that any reference to the term 'bill of lading' in the Act
shall 'not include references to a document which is incapable of transfer either by
indorsement or, as a bearer bill, by delivery without indorsement'. The so-called straight bill
of lading (not made out 'to order') which is incapable of transfer does not therefore fall within
the definition of bill of lading in section 1(2)(a) and cannot operate to transfer rights under
section 2. Gaskell makes the following comment in this regard,
'Nevertheless, it was intended that holders of such documents should be entitled
to sue the carrier and the straight bill would be treated, in effect, as a sea waybill
in section 1(3) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1992. A straight bill is
certainly one which identifies the consignee as the person to delivery is to be
made within section 1(3)(b)'.82
                                                
80 The similarity in the wording of this provision and section 1 of the 1855 Act is quite clear. See
further Rights of Suit at 203.
81 See Gaskell, op cit at 122.
82 See Gaskell, op cit at 147. Section 1(3) provides that any references to 'sea waybill' in the Act 'are
references to any document which is not a bill of lading but-
(a) is such a receipt for goods as contains or evidences a contract for the carriage of
goods by sea; and
(b) identifies the person to whom delivery of the goods is to be made by the carrier in
accordance with that contract’.
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The Law Commissions placed a general emphasis on the ‘transfer of rights’ as opposed a
‘creation of new rights’ in favour of third parties simply because the mechanism of ‘transfer
of rights’ provides for more commercial certainty.83 In this way the holder of a bill of lading
acquires an accrued claim and the carrier need not be concerned about the actions of previous
holders of the bill.84
In instances where the carrier has delivered the cargo to the transferee and the bill is
transferred to a subsequent holder after the bill ceases to be a transferable document of title,
section 2(2)(a) allows such holder to acquire contractual rights provided it became holder
pursuant to a contractual arrangement (for example a pledge) made before the bill ceased to
be an effective document of title.85 Section 2(2)(b) provides for the transfer of rights to a
holder in pursuance of a re-indorsement of a bill of lading after the rejection of the goods or
the documents.86
Under the 1855 Act, property has to pass to the person who wishes to sue on the terms of the
contract of carriage. However, under UK COGSA ’92, rights of suit are dependent upon the
lawful possession of a bill of lading, irrespective of ownership in the goods. Section 2(4)
envisages the situation where loss or damage is sustained by a party who owns or bears the
risk in relation to the goods described in the bill of lading but who does not lawfully possess
the bill and subsequently does not have rights of suit against the carrier. It empowers the
holder of the bill to sue for and on behalf of that person.87 There is however no obligation on
the lawful holder to sue on behalf of the owner of the goods.88 Gaskell suggests that where
the lawful holder refuses to sue on behalf of the owner under section 2(4), the owner may
have to proceed in tort.89
Section 2(5) of UK COGSA '92 confirms that the bill of lading shipper and all those parties
intermediately entitled under the bill of lading lose their contractual rights against the carrier
when someone else acquires them. This subsection shall be discussed in more detail in
paragraph 5.2.1 below.
                                                
83 See Rights of Suit at 203.
84 See Rights of Suit at 203.
85 See Rights of Suit at 203. See further Halsbury's, op cit at par 1561.
86 See Rights of Suit at 204.
87 See Rights of Suit at 204.
88 See Gaskell, op cit at 129.
89 See Gaskell, op cit at 129.
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In general, the transfer of a bill of lading to an agent merely to allow him to deal with the
goods on behalf of the owner and for example to take delivery of them or to stop the goods in
transit is of no effect because there is no intention on the part of the owner to have that
effect.90 The agent cannot thereafter divest the owner of his rights to and in the goods by
subsequently transferring the bill of lading to another. Rights may however be transferred
where the agent is duly authorized by the owner to do so.
5.1.1.2 Section 3: Liabilities under Shipping Documents
Section 3(1) of UK COGSA ’92 effectively separates the transfer of rights and liabilities and
provides that a holder of a bill of lading shall only be subject to the same obligations where
he:
‘3(1)(a) takes or demands delivery from the carrier of any goods to which the
document relates;
 (b) makes a claim under the contract of carriage against the carrier in
respect of any of those goods; or
 (c) is a person who, at a time before those rights were vested in him, took
or demanded ... delivery from the carrier of any of those goods,
that person  shall (by virtue of taking or demanding delivery or making the
claim or, in a case falling within paragraph (c) above, of having the rights
vested in him) become subject to the same liabilities under the contract as
if he had been a party to that contract’.
The Law Commissions, in splitting the rights from the liabilities, sought to preserve the
position of banks and other institutions which, in exchange for advancing money for the
purchase of cargo, held security in bills of lading and other shipping documents.91 Banks in
most instances had no intention of acquiring ownership of the goods and as a result generally
                                                
90 See Halsbury’s, op cit at 1555.
91 See Halsbury’s, op cit at par 1568; Rights of Suit at 205; Reynolds The Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act 1992 Put to the Test 1999 LMCLQ 161; In The Berge Sisar [1998] 4 All ER 821 at 832 the
Court of Appeal makes the following comment in this regard:
‘One sees therefore that ... it was the policy of those who were responsible for drafting
the 1992 Act to restrict the person who were subject to liabilities under the bills of lading
to a narrower class than those who obtained rights under the bills’.
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went unaffected by the provisions of the 1855 Act. The Law Commissions make the
following comment in their report:
‘Given the decision to divorce the acquisition of contractual rights from the
passing of property, it became apparent that contractual rights and liabilities
could not be linked in the way which obtains under the 1855 Act, since banks and
others who merely hold bills of lading as security would without more be liable
in respect of substantive obligations such as freight and demurrage’.92
Despite the fact that one may possess a bill of lading but not be subject to the liabilities
thereunder, it goes without saying that one cannot, under section 3(1) of the Act, make a
demand where there is no right to claim delivery. It is therefore a precondition of section 3(1)
that the person who makes the demand is the person in whom rights have vested under
section 2(1).93
The liabilities will attach from the moment the demand is made as opposed to the time of
delivery. The Law Commissions considered this to be fair especially if one considers that the
demand may cause the ship to berth at a particular dock where demurrage may be incurred.94
Furthermore, if the carrier delivers the cargo to the lawful owner who is not also the lawful
holder of the bill of lading, Gaskell believes that the owner cannot be held liable under
section (3), if rights did not vest in it by operation of section 2(1).95 He comments further on
the unlikelihood of the carrier delivering the cargo without the owner presenting some form
of identification and sees no reason why a Brandt v Liverpool contract could not be implied
in the circumstances.96
The English court in The Aegean Sea97 (which case is discussed in more detail in paragraph
5.3.1 below) was called upon to decide, inter alia, whether or not liabilities under a bill of
lading could pass to the cargo receiver where it had issued a letter of indemnity to the carrier
in respect of liabilities which the carrier might incur for delivery of the cargo without
production of the relevant bill of lading.98 The court held, albeit arguably obiter, that the letter
of indemnity did not constitute a demand for delivery of the cargo nor did it oblige the cargo
                                                
92 See Rights of Suit at 205.
93 See Gaskell, op cit at 132.
94 See Gaskell, op cit at 133.
95 See Gaskell, op cit at 133.
96 See Gaskell, op cit at 133.
97 The Aegean Sea [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 39.
98 See Gaskell, op cit at 135.
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receiver to take delivery.99 It constituted nothing more than an undertaking to provide an
indemnity for certain claims if delivery was in fact made.100 Notwithstanding the letter of
indemnity, the carrier remained under an obligation to deliver the cargo to the lawful holder
of the bill of lading and was not bound to deliver under the indemnity.101
The House of Lords in The Berge Sisar102 recently held that 'delivery in terms of pars. (a) and
(c) means ... the voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another. This is more
than just co-operating in the discharge of the cargo from the vessel’.103 In casu, the interim
holder of the relevant bills of lading directed the master of the vessel to its import jetty in
order to take routine samples of the cargo before clearing the vessel for discharge. Upon
discovering that the cargo was not of contractual quality the interim holder rejected the cargo
and on-sold it to a subsequent buyer and holder of the bills. The court held that the interim
holder’s assistance in the discharge of the cargo or the fact that it directed the master to its
import jetty did not constitute ‘taking or demanding of delivery’ of the cargo as envisaged in
section 3 of UK COGSA ’92.
In relation to ship's delivery orders, section 3(2) provides that 'the liabilities … shall exclude
liabilities in respect of any goods to which the order does not relate'. Similar therefore to a
bill of lading holder, the person identified in a ship's delivery order may become subject to
the same liabilities under that contract as if it had been a party to the contract of carriage.104
The person identified in a ship's delivery order may therefore also incur liabilities under the
contract of carriage in the same way as the lawful holder of a bill of lading, in other words, by
taking or demanding delivery from the carrier but only in relation to the goods described in
the order.105
Section 3(3) of UK COGSA ’92 provides that:
‘This section, so far as it imposes liabilities under any contract on any person,
shall be without prejudice to the liabilities under the contract of any person as an
original party to the contract’.
                                                
99 See Gaskell, op cit at 135 fn 112.
100 The Aegean Sea [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 39 at 62. See also Gaskell, op cit at 135.
101 See Gaskell, op cit at 135.
102 The Berge Sisar [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 663 which is discussed in more detail in par 5.2.1.
103 The Berge Sisar [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 663 at 675.
104 See Gaskell, op cit at 145.
105 See Gaskell, op cit at 144. See also Rights of Suit at 206.
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The Law Commissions maintained the view that under the 1855 Act the original shipper
remained liable under the bill of lading despite any subsequent transfer of rights to an
indorsee.106 Section 3(3) was therefore recommended with a view to retaining the position
under the 1855 Act. This view is confirmed by the decision in The Giannis NK.107 The court
in casu held that the liabilities were concurrent in that the holder of the bill of lading came
under the same liabilities as the shipper; more particularly, the holder’s liability ‘was to be by
way of addition, not substitution’.108
5.1.2 Section 4 of the STDA: Transfer of Rights and Obligations
Section 4 embodies the very essence of the STDA in that it seeks to remedy the problems of
the 1855 Act and provides for the transfer of contractual rights of suit to a holder of a
‘negotiable or transferable’ sea transport document regardless of whether the holder acquires
property in the goods or not. Title to sue is now derived from a claimant’s status as holder of
a sea transport document.109 Section 4 reads as follows:
‘4(1) The holder of a sea transport document –
(a) is subject to the same obligations and entitled to the same rights against the
person by whom or on whose behalf the document was issued or who is
responsible for the performance of the contract of carriage evidenced by or
contained in the document as if the holder were a party to a contract with
that person on the terms of the document; and
(b) must be regarded as the cessionary of all rights of action for the loss of or
damage to the goods referred to in the document, whether arising from
contract or the ownership of the goods or otherwise.
  (2) A holder who has transferred a sea transport document must be regarded as
having ceded his, her or its rights and as having delegated his, her or its
obligations to the new holder except in so far as those rights or obligations
arise from a delectus personae relating to the holder’.
                                                
106 See Rights of Suit at 206. See also Gaskell, op cit at 139. Section 2 of the 1855 expressly
preserved the shipper’s liability for freight but also did not relieve him of any liability to which he
was subject in terms of the common law.
107 The Giannis NK [1998] Lloyd’s Rep. 337.
108 See Hare, op cit at 521; as well as Gaskell, op cit at 139.
109 See discussion in par 5.3 below.
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This provision is therefore similar to section 2 of UK COGSA '92 in that there is no longer
the requirement for ownership or 'property' in the goods to be transferred 'upon or by reason
of the consignment or indorsement' of a bill of lading, in order for contractual rights of suit to
be transferred to the consignee or indorsee.
A sea transport document is defined under section 1 of the STDA as 'a bill of lading; a
through bill of lading; a combined transport bill of lading; a sea waybill; or any consignment
note, combined transport document or other similar document, relating to the carriage of
goods either wholly or partly by sea, irrespective of whether it is transferable or negotiable'.
Section 2(2) however provides that section 4 (including 3,5 and 6) shall only apply in respect
of sea transport documents that are ‘transferable and negotiable’. The transfer of rights
provisions under the STDA therefore find no application in the case of sea waybills and non-
negotiable receipts which are by definition not transferable. Although there is no express
reference to a ship's delivery order in the STDA, it is arguable that 'sea transport document' as
a general term envisages a ship's delivery order as 'any other similar document relating to the
carriage of goods either wholly or partly by sea'. Whether or not any rights therein may be
transferred shall depend upon the manner in which the document is drawn and whether it is
'transferable or negotiable' as required under section 2(2) of the STDA.
Similar to the UK COGSA ’92, the STDA works with the concept of transferring existing
rights as opposed to creating new rights in favour of the holder.110
In relation to the wording of section 4(1), Hare states that this section:
‘finally dispel(s) any doubts which may exist as to the efficacy of the transfer
provisions of the Bills of Lading Act, 1855, and would extend equally to claims
based upon jurisdiction new to the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act,
1983’(inserted).111
Section 4 of the STDA makes reference to cession as the means by which rights are
transferred under the STDA. In terms of South African common law all contractual rights are,
in principle, freely cedable except where the relationship between the debtor and the creditor
is of such a nature that it involves the element of delectus personae or the contract contains a
                                                
110 See discussion under par 5.1.1.
111 See Hare, op cit at 524.
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valid pactum de non cedendo.112 Hiemstra and Gonin in their Trilingual Legal Dictionary
define the expression ‘delectus personae’ as a ‘choice of an irreplaceable person (bound to a
specific performance of the undertaking)’.113 It implies that a contractual right cannot be
ceded without the debtor’s consent in instances where the debtor’s performance would ‘differ
in character’ from the performance which he is to render to his original creditor.114 In the
words of Innes, CJ in Eastern Rand Exploration Co. Ltd v AJT Nel and Others,115:
‘... the question of whether one of two contracting parties can by cession of his interest,
establish a cessionary in his place without the consent of the other contracting party
depends upon whether or not the contract is so personal in its character that it can make
any reasonable or substantial difference to the other party whether the cedent or the
cessionary is entitled to enforce it. Subject to certain exceptions founded upon the above
principle rights of action may, in our law, be freely ceded.’
The test for determining whether a right arising from a contract involving a delectus personae
is cedable is therefore determined with reference to the debtor’s obligation to the creditor. As
stated by Botha, JA in Densam (Pty) Ltd v Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd:
‘The question whether a claim (that is, a right flowing from a contract) is not cedable because
the contract involves a delectus personae falls to be answered with reference, not to the nature
of the cedent’s obligation vis-à-vis the debtor, which remains unaffected by the cession, but to
the nature of the debtor’s obligation vis-à-vis the cedent, which is the counterpart of the cedent’s
right, the subject-matter of the transfer comprising the cession. The point can be demonstrated
by the lecture-room example of a contract between a master and servant which involves the
rendering of personal services by the servant to his master: the master may not cede his right (or
claim) to receive the services from the servant to a third party without the servant’s consent
because of the nature of the latter’s obligation to render the services; but a common law the
servant may freely cede to a third party his right (or claim) to be remunerated for his services,
because of the nature of the master’s corresponding obligation to pay for them, and despite the
nature of the servant’s obligation to render them’.116
In the context of the STDA, the shipper is upon transfer of the sea transport document
regarded as having ceded all his rights under the contract of carriage to the consignee or
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subsequent holder. Where the contract of carriage is of such a personal nature that it involves
a delectus personae, the test for determining whether the shipper’s rights are cedable is
determined with reference to the carrier’s obligation to the shipper; for example, to deliver
the goods in the condition in which they were received, which more often than not would not
involve a delectus personae.
Section 4(2) appears to reflect an intention to prevent the shipper or any subsequent holder of
a transferable sea transport document from avoiding any obligations vis-à-vis the carrier by
simply ceding the relevant document over to a third party.117
Delegation is a form of novation and, in terms of our common law, requires the consent of the
creditor in order to effect a true delegation of the debtor’s obligations.118 Delegation has the
effect of irrevocably transferring obligations from an original debtor to a new debtor with the
result that the creditor can sue the new but not the original debtor.119 In terms of section 4, the
transfer of obligations takes place by operation of law and, unless the nature of the
relationship between the shipper and the carrier is so personal in nature that it involves a
delectus personae, the obligations of the shipper to pay for example freight pass to the
transferee or consignee without the carrier’s consent. A shipper’s obligation not to deliver
dangerous cargo to the carrier without fully disclosing the nature of the cargo to the carrier
may have the effect that the shipper’s obligations, at least in this instance, are not
transferable.
Unlike section 3 of UK COGSA '92 where there is a split between the transfer of rights and
liabilities, section 4 provides for the simultaneous transfer of both rights and obligations.
Interim holders such as banks who merely hold sea transport documents as security for
monies advanced to buyers of cargo may find themselves exposed to a claim by the carrier
under the STDA.
The question arises as to whether the original party to whom the 'transferable' sea transport
document was issued remains liable under the contract of carriage despite the transfer of
rights of suit. The STDA is by no means as clear on the issue as UK COGSA '92. Section
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4(1), employing similar wording to that of the 1855 Act, provides that the holder is 'subject to
the same obligations' against the carrier as if the holder were a party to the contract of
carriage. As discussed above,120 the House of Lords in The Giannis NK,121 having considered
the wording of the 1855 Act, held that the holder of the bill of lading came, by way of
addition, under the same liability as the shipper; the shipper remaining liable to the carrier
under the contract. In view of similarity of the wording in the STDA to the 1855 Act, the
decision of The Giannis NK and Hare's comment thereon that as a post 1 November 1983
decision, it is persuasive to the extent that it amends earlier decisions on the basis of them
being wrongly expounded at the time, it is arguable that the original party to whom a
transferable sea transport document has been issued remains liable after the document has
been transferred, despite the use of the words 'delegation of obligations' in the STDA which
should effectively result in the complete transfer of obligations from one debtor to the next.122
The provisions dealing with the transfer of rights and obligations under UK COGSA ’92 not
only provide more clarity in some respects but are clearly more extensive than those of the
STDA.
5.2 The Interim Holder
5.2.1 Section 2(5) of UK COGSA 92
Section 2(5) of UK COGSA ’92 provides that:
‘Where rights are transferred by virtue of the operation of subsection (1) above
in relation to any document, the transfer for which that subsection provides
shall extinguish any entitlement to those rights which derives-
(a) where that document is a bill of lading, from a person’s having been an
original party to the contract of carriage; or
(b) in the case of any document to which this Act applies, from the previous
operation of that subsection in relation to that document;
but the operation of that subsection shall be without prejudice to any rights
which derive from a person’s having been an original party to the contract
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contained in, or evidenced by, a sea waybill and, in relation to a ship’s delivery
order, shall be without prejudice to any rights deriving otherwise than from the
previous operation of that subsection in relation to that order’.
Section 2(5) confirms in relation to the bill of lading shipper and all intermediate persons
entitled under the bill that all rights of suit are lost when someone else acquires them.123  The
Law Commissions make the following comment in this regard:
‘In the case of those who at some time were entitled to delivery under a bill of
lading, sea waybill or ship’s delivery order, but in circumstances where
someone else has subsequently become entitled to delivery, there are no
compelling reasons why such people should retain contractual rights of suit,
and under the 1855 Act previous holders of bills of lading lost their rights of
suit when they were transferred in the way stipulated by section 1’.124
Subsections (a) and (b) similarly apply to those intermediately entitled under sea waybills and
ship's delivery orders. However, section 2(5) does not extinguish the contractual rights
against the carrier of the original party to a sea waybill and ship's delivery order upon
transfer.125 The Law Commissions felt that the rights of a sea waybill shipper should not be
prejudiced on the basis that the sea waybill shipper, unlike the bill of lading holder which
loses its rights to control the goods when the bill is transferred, retains its rights of disposal
until delivery and since the sea waybill is 'primarily a contract between a shipper and a carrier
which happens to benefit a third party, it is important that a waybill shipper should be able to
retain contractual rights if he wishes'.126
The question of whether an intermediate holder of a bill of lading remained liable under the
contract of carriage after having transferred its rights to a subsequent holder came before the
English High Court in the matter of The Berge Sisar.127 The facts of the case are briefly as
follows: During October 1993, Borealis purchased a cargo of 43,000 tonnes of field grade
propane from Stargas. It was an express term of the contract of sale that the cargo should not
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contain more than a certain degree of corrosive compounds. The cargo was shipped under 5
bills of lading from Saudi Arabia to Sweden on board the “Berge Sisar” which was chartered
out to Stargas by the vessel’s owners, Bergesen. Stargas had purchased part of cargo directly
from Saudi Aramco and in part from intermediate sellers who themselves either directly or
indirectly purchased the cargo from Saudi Aramco. On arrival of the cargo in Stenungsund,,
Borealis directed the master of the vessel to its import jetty in order to take samples of the
cargo. The samples revealed that the propane was not of contractual quality. Borealis
immediately rejected the cargo and sold it to Dow Europe. It subsequently also indorsed the
bills of lading to Dow Europe. Borealis thereafter commenced action against Stargas claiming
damages for breach of contract. Stargas in turn issued a third party notice against Bergesen
claiming an indemnity in respect of any claim for which it may be held liable to Borealis.
Bergesen served a counterclaim against Stargas for damage caused to the vessel by the
corrosive compounds in the cargo. Furthermore, and most important to this study, Bergesen
instituted claims against both Saudi Aramco and Borealis on the basis that both parties were
liable under the bills of lading. More particularly, that Borealis, by virtue of section 3(1) of
UK COGSA ’92, was liable as lawful holder of the bills of lading on the basis that it
demanded or requested delivery of the cargo from Bergesen and having done so, became
subject to the same liabilities under the contracts of carriage as if it had been a party to the
contracts. As already discussed above,128 the court found that the actions of Borealis ‘fell far
short of amounting to the making of any demand for delivery’ as required under section 3.129
As to the question of the liability of an interim holder, the court relied upon the decision of
Smurthwaite v Wilkins130 where an intermediate holder was found not to be liable for freight
and held the following:
‘In the Act section 2(1) and section 3(1) adopt the crucial wording of the 1855
Act which formed the basis of Smurthwaite v Wilkins and other similar cases:
‘shall have transferred to and vested in him all rights of suit under the contract of
carriage if ...’ – ‘shall become subject to the same liabilities under that contract
as if ...’. Those words having been previously construed as having a certain
effect, their repetition in the 1992 Act implies that the draftsman expected them
to continue to be construed in the same way. Smurthwaite v Wilkins is referred to
in the report and is adopted rather than criticized. There is no provision in the Act
which contradicts the intention that that decision should still have force’.
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In the circumstances, interim holders, under English law, do not remain liable under the
contract of carriage where the bill of lading has been transferred to a subsequent holder.
Reynolds makes the following comment in respect of the Court of Appeal’s decision in which
the same view was expressed:
‘it is obviously rather undignified that such a carefully drafted modern Act, far
longer and more elaborate than its three-section predecessor, should require to be
salvaged by a case of 1862 on an Act of 1855, in which it is said that the drafting
of that Act otherwise gave rise to a ‘manifest unjust’ result’.131
5.2.2 Interim Holder under the STDA
Unlike UK COGSA '92, there is no express provision in the STDA relating to interim
holders.
Section 4(1)(b) specifically provides that the holder of a sea transport document 'must be
regarded as the cessionary of all rights of action' and 'must be regarded as having ceded … its
rights'. Under a true cession, the cedant is required to be divested of his rights of suit against
the debtor.132 Although there is no provision in the STDA similar to section 2(5) of UK
COGSA '92, it is arguable that this principle echoes the provisions of that section which
extinguishes the rights of the shipper, as an original party to the contract of carriage, and
intermediate holders of bills of lading (or, in the language of the STDA, intermediate holders
of 'transferable or negotiable' sea transport documents) when they are transferred to someone
else. Furthermore, the use of the words 'must' in section 4, the intention of the South African
legislature in drafting the STDA to 'clarify the position'133 and the fact that this was the
position under the 1855 Act, supports the view that the position under the STDA with regards
to the transfer of 'all rights of suit' is similar to the position under UK COGSA '92. It is
therefore submitted that an interim holder, like the original party to whom the transferable sea
transport was issued, loses rights upon transfer of the document to another.
                                                
131 Reynolds, The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 Put to the Test (1999) Lloyd's Maritime &
Commercial L.Q. 161 at 163.
132 Christie The Law of Contract Butterworths 1996 at 515.
133 See Government Gazette No.18541 of 12 December 1997 Draft Sea Transport Documents Bill -
Invitation to Comment.
37
In regard to whether or not the interim holder remains liable after transfer of the sea transport
document, it is arguable that the interim holder does not remain liable if one has regard to the
rational behind the decisions in The Berge Sisar, more particularly Smurthwaite v Wilkins
above, and the fact that the STDA uses similar language to that of the 1855 Act. In other
words, the STDA speaks of a cession ‘of all rights of action’ and the holder becomes subject
to the ‘same obligations’ as under the 1855 Act.
The STDA similarly does not split the transfer of rights from liabilities with the result that
interim holders may find themselves exposed to a claim by the carrier under the STDA.
5.3 Holder of a Sea Transport Document
By virtue of section 2 of UK COGSA ’92 and section 4 of the STDA, the transfer of
contractual rights of suit in a bill of lading, under English and South African law (to be
enacted), no longer depends upon ‘property’ in or ownership of the goods described in the
bill, but whether or not the holder of the bill is the lawful holder.
5.3.1 ‛Lawful Holder under UK COGSA '92
In terms of section 5(2), a 'lawful holder' is defined as:
‘(a) a person with possession of the bill who, by virtue of being the person
identified in the bill, is the consignee of the goods to which the bill relates;
(b) a person with possession of the bill as a result of the completion, by delivery of
the bill, of any indorsement of the bill or, in the case of a bearer bill, of any
other transfer of the bill;
(c) a person with possession of the bill as a result of any transaction by virtue of
which he would have become a holder falling within paragraph (a) or (b)
above had not the transaction been effected at a time when possession of the
bill no longer gave a right (as against the carrier) to possession of the goods to
which the bill relates;
 ... wherever he has become the holder of the bill in good faith’.
By virtue of section 5(2), the term ‘lawful holder’ therefore not only embraces a consignee or
indorsee in possession of a bill of lading in good faith, including the holder of a bearer bill,
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but furthermore includes the holder of a bill of lading which has ceased to be a document of
title; ie. a spent bill.134
In the fairly recent decision of The Aegean Sea135, the English High Court was called upon to
decide whether a cargo receiver in possession of a bill of lading, erroneously indorsed and
delivered to him, qualified as a ‘holder’ of the bill under section 5(2)(b) of UK COGSA ’92.
The facts of this case are briefly as follows. An oil tanker fully laden with cargo ran aground
on the Torre de Hercules rocks in Spain resulting in the loss of the vessel in the subsequent
explosion, including most of her cargo. The vessel’s owners faced substantial claims for both
pollution and salvage and therefore sought to claim an indemnity from the vessel’s voyage
charterers, ROIL, who allegedly committed breach of the charterparty for having nominated
an unsafe port. In addition thereto, the vessel’s owners claimed an indemnity from Repsol,
the parent company of ROIL, who purchased the cargo from the latter on 20 November 1992,
on the basis of it being the lawful holder of the bill of lading and as such became subject to
the liabilities by reason of the provisions of UK COGSA ’92. ROIL initially purchased the
cargo from Louis Dreyfus on or about 18 November 1992. The bill, which was drawn to the
order of Louis Dreyfus, was however indorsed to Repsol on 17 December 1992. The indorsed
bill was thereafter sent to ROIL, who in turn forwarded the bill to Repsol. The bill was
erroneously indorsed to the Repsol instead of ROIL. Upon becoming aware of the error,
Repsol returned the bill to Louis Dreyfus for cancellation and re-indorsement to ROIL. The
vessel’s owners argued that Repsol became the holder of the indorsed bill of lading by virtue
of it having received the bill; it was of no consequence to them that Repsol had no intention
of accepting the bill in the circumstances.
The court in casu rejected the owners’ argument and found that in order for an indorsee to
qualify as a ‘holder’ for purposes of the COGSA ’92 (UK), a consensual element must be
present. The indorsee must not only receive the bill of lading physically but he is also
required to accept delivery before he can become a ‘holder’, as defined in section 5(2).
Thomas J, decides as follows:
‘I do not consider that a person satisfies the requirements under s. 5 (2)(b) and
becomes the holder of a bill of lading if that person obtains the bill of lading merely
in consequence of someone endorsing it and sending it to him. The section requires
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him to have possession as a result of the completion of an indorsement by delivery.
Although the sending and receipt of a document through the post often constitutes
service of a document, the sending of a bill of lading through the post does not
without more constitute delivery; the person receiving it has to receive it into his
possession and accept the delivery before he becomes the holder. Moreover the bill
of lading was never delivered to Repsol by Louis Dreyfus; Louis Dreyfus sent the bill
to ROIL under cover of a letter addressed to ROIL. It was sent to ROIL as principles;
it was not delivered by Louis Dreyfus to ROIL to receive as Repsol’s agents as it was
intended for ROIL and the covering letter was addressed to them. There was
therefore no delivery by Louis Dreyfus to Repsol, only a delivery to ROIL. ... In my
view Repsol never obtained possession of the bill of lading as the result of
completion by delivery of the bill by indorsement. There was never any delivery of
the bill of lading by Louis Dreyfus to Repsol to complete the indorsement. Even if
Repsol had obtained possession of the bill of lading from Louis Dreyfus, they never
accepted delivery of it as the indorsee or transferee. As soon as they saw the
indorsement to them, they sent it back to be indorsed to the rightful indorsee and
transferee’.136
Regarding the concept of ‘good faith’, Gaskell makes the following comment:
‘It is probably true to say that English law has not developed a general
overriding contractual principle of ‘good faith’ as other countries have, but
there are examples of the expression appearing in statutes. Essentially the
requirement is one of honesty, at least. Broader principles of good faith
(particularly in the formation of contract) might require a ‘principle of fair and
open dealing’ but it may be that the requirement in section 5(2) is somewhat
narrower, requiring concentration simply on how the bill of lading was
acquired. This will, perhaps, more usually be an issue between the holder and
the previous holder, rather than between the holder and the carrier’.137
5.3.2 ‛Holder and MalaFide Possessor under the STDA
In terms of section 3(2) of the STDA, a ‘holder’ of a sea transport document is defined as any
person who is in possession of an original sea transport document and that person is the
person to whom the document was issued, the consignee named in the document or the
transferee.138
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The concept of possession is not defined in the STDA. According to the South African
common law possession can only be acquired corpore et animo.139 In order to acquire
possession of a thing, physical control must be accompanied by the animus possidendi or the
intention to possess.140 Physical control, or even mere awareness of possession, is insufficient
to constitute possession.141 Similar therefore to the position under English law, as expounded
by Thomas, J in The Aegean Sea,142 one cannot, in terms of the South African common law,
possess a sea transport document and qualify as a ‘holder’ where one has control but lacks a
particular subjective state of mind.143
Possession need not necessarily be lawful.144 A thief could therefore qualify as a ‘holder’ of,
for example, a bearer bill for purposes of the STDA. The extent to which such a thief would
obtain any rights under the bill is determined by section 8 of the STDA which deals with the
acquisition of possession of sea transport documents in instances where possession is
obtained in bad faith. Section 8(1)(a) provides that no person shall be entitled to any rights or
defences under the STDA in instances where that person, at the time of acquiring possession,
knew or had reasonable grounds for believing that –
‘i) the goods to which the document related had not been shipped or received
for shipment; or
 ii) the person from whom possession was acquired had no right to transfer the
document or any right thereunder’.
The South African courts have repeatedly described contracts as acts involving good faith.145
There is, however, in terms of the South African common law, like the English law, no
general overriding requirement for contracts to be concluded or exercised in good faith.146 In
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order to ensure the fair operation of contracts between parties, van der Merwe et al, like
Gaskell, suggest the following:
‘A better approach would be to accept that good faith, as a value or principle
which underlies and informs the more technical rules of the law of contract and
in which must be given concrete content when applied in particular instances
(such as how the bill of lading was acquired), also applies to the operation of a
contract’(inserted).147
Section 8(1)(a)(ii) of the STDA reflects well known South African common law principle
nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habuit. In terms of this principle, ‘no
one can transfer more rights to another than he himself has’.148
Section 3(3) contemplates lost sea transport documents and requires that a person ‘must be
regarded as being in possession ... of an original sea transport document’ in instances where
the document is lost and that person would have been entitled to possession of the original
document if it could be produced.149 This clause was apparently inserted into the STDA in
order to provide for some degree of flexibility and to cater for those instances where only a
faxed copy of the relevant sea transport document could be produced.150
5.4 Representations in Bills of Lading and Other Sea Transport Documents
5.4.1 Section 4 of UK COGSA 92
Section 4 of UK COGSA ’92 provides that a bill of lading, signed by the master of a ship or a
person with authority to sign the bill of lading, shall in the hands of the holder be conclusive
evidence as against the carrier of the receipt for shipment or actual shipment of the goods
concerned.151 The Law Commissions saw it fit to introduce this provision in order to deal
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with the inadequacies of the rule in Grant v Norway152 and the subsequent attempt to put
things right by way of section 3 of the 1855 Act.153 As discussed above, section 3 of the 1855
Act was effective only as against the Master or ‘other person so signing’.154 Section 4 creates
a statutory estoppel in favour of the bill of lading holder effectively disposing, to some extent,
of the rule in Grant v Norway.155
The right of estoppel shall not apply where the bill of lading has not been
transferred.156Section 5(5) of UK COGSA ’92 provides that the Act:
‘shall have effect without prejudice to the application ... of the rules (the
Hague-Visby Rules which for the time being have force of law by virtue of
section 1 of the [1971 c.19] Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971’.
Therefore, in the absence of transfer, Art III Rule 4 of the Hague-Visby Rules provides that
the bill of lading shall only be prima facie evidence of receipt for shipment.157
Furthermore, section 4 applies specifically to bills of lading and not to any other non-
transferable document such as a sea waybill. The party identified in a sea waybill will
therefore not benefit from the statutory estoppel created under this section.158
So-called ‘claused’ or ‘qualified’ bills of lading that contain statements such as ‘weight and
quantity unknown’ will be conclusive of very little. Similarly, bills indorsed with the words
‘shipper’s count’ or ‘STC (said to contain)’ will only be evidence of a single package and the
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shipper will be bear the onus of proving the quantity of goods shipped in terms of the bill of
lading.
Although there is merit in the argument that carriers should be bound by their representations
no matter what documents they sign, the Law Commissions believed that they had no
mandate to legislate and extend the Hague-Visby Rules to other documents like the sea
waybill. Under section 1(6)(b) of the UK COGSA ’71, where the Rules apply to non-
negotiable documents such as sea waybills, the second sentence of Art III Rule 4 shall be
expressly disapplied with the result that sea waybills are merely prima facie evidence of the
receipt by the carrier of the goods to which the sea waybill relates.159
Of particular interest, the P & O Nedlloyd Non-Negotiable Waybill contractually extends the
application of Art III Rule 4 to waybills in order to bridge the gap left by section 1(6)(b) of
UK COGSA ’71 and UK COGSA ’92.160
5.4.2 Section 6 of STDA: Evidence of Shipment
Section 6 of the STDA provides as follows:
‘A sea transport document that-
(a) represents that goods have been shipped on board a vessel or have been
received for shipment on board a vessel; and
(b) has been signed by the master of the vessel or by another person who had
the actual authority, whether express or implied, or the ostensible authority
of the carrier to sign that document,
                                                
159 Section 1(6)(b) of COGSA ’71 (UK) provides that:
“... the Rules shall have force of law in relation to ... any receipt which is a non-
negotiable document marked as such if the contract contained in or evidenced by it is a
contract for the carriage of goods by sea which expressly provides that the Rules are to
govern the contract as if the receipt were a bill of lading, but subject ... to any
necessary modifications and in particular with the omission in Article III of the Rules
of the second sentence of paragraph 4 and of paragraph 7”.
For ease of reference, the ‘second sentence of paragraph 4’ of Article III Rule 4 of the Hague-
Visby Rules states that ‘proof to the contrary shall not be admissible when the bill of lading has
been transferred to a third party acting in good faith’. See also Humphries & Higgs, An Overview
of the Implications of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (1993) J. of Business Law 61 at 65.
160 See Gaskell, op cit at 732.
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is, as against the carrier-
(i) prima facie evidence in favour of a holder of the document, who is the
shipper or other person to whom it was issued; and
(ii) conclusive evidence in favour of a subsequent holder,
of the shipment of the goods or of their receipt for shipment, as the case may be.’
The similarity in the wording of section 6 of the STDA and section 4 of UK COGSA ’92 is
clearly evident. Both Acts contain the conclusive evidence provisions in favour of the
‘subsequent holder’ and dispel, to a certain extent, the application of the Grant v Norway
principle. No proof to the contrary may be tendered except possibly that the subsequent
holder was not bona fide, as required by section 8, and is therefore debarred from relying on
the representation under this section.161
Section 2(2) of the STDA provides that section 3,4,5 and 6 shall apply only to sea transport
documents that are ‘transferable or negotiable’. Therefore, the conclusive evidence provision
in section 6 of the STDA, like UK COGSA ’92, only applies in relation to subsequent holders
of transferable bills of lading. Sea waybills and non-negotiable receipts do not benefit from
the statutory estoppel. The South African Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, No 1 of 1986 ("SA
COGSA '86") which makes the Hague-Visby Rules applicable in South Africa contains in
section 1(1)(c),162 similar wording to that which appears in section 1(6)(b) of the UK COGSA
’71, and also provides for the non-application of the second sentence of Art III Rule 4 where
the Hague-Visby Rules apply to non-negotiable documents such as sea waybills. Sea waybills
are therefore only prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods to which the
sea waybill relates.
Unlike the clarity given in section 5(5) of UK COGSA ’92, it is unclear under South African
law as to what extent the STDA will supersede the provisions of SA COGSA ’86. As Hare
                                                
161 See Government Gazette No.18541 of 12 December 1997 Draft Sea Transport Documents Bill -
Invitation to Comment at par 30.5.
162 Section 1(1)(c) provides:
‘any receipt which is a non-negotiable document marked as such if the contract contained
in it or evidenced by it or pursuant to which it is issued is a contract for the carriage of
goods by sea which expressly provides that the Rules are to govern the contract as if the
receipt were a bill of lading, but subject to the necessary modifications and in particular
with the omission of Art III of the Rules of the second sentence of paragraph 4 and
paragraph 7.’
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suggests, this will only be possible to the extent that the STDA does not lessen the carrier’s
minimum liability laid down in the Hague-Visby Rules.163
5.5 Application of the Acts in General
The manner in which the UK COGSA ’92 and STDA differ in their general application shall
be discussed below.
5.5.1 General Application of UK COGSA 92
First and foremost, the UK COGSA ’92 repeals the 1855 Act in section 6(2). It further
provides in section 6(3) that ‘nothing in this Act shall have effect in relation to any document
issued before the coming into force of this Act’.164
Finally, section 5(5) of UK COGSA ’92 provides that the provisions of the Act:
‘shall have effect without prejudice to the application, in relation to any case, of
the rules (the Hague-Visby Rules) which for the time being have the force of law
by virtue of section 1 of the [1971 c 19] Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971’.165
5.5.2 General Application of the STDA
Unlike UK COGSA ’92, section 2(1) of the STDA provides that the Act shall apply to sea
transport documents issued before and after the commencement of the STDA – the decision
of the legislature being to clarify any uncertainty in this field of law.166
                                                
163 See Hare, op cit at 524.
164 See Title to Sue, op cit at 208. See also Reynolds, The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (1993)
Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial L.Q. 436 at 440.
165 See Rights of Suit at 207.
166 See Government Gazette No.18541 of 12 December 1997 Draft Sea Transport Documents Bill -
Invitation to Comment at 6, cl 27.
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The STDA shall also apply to goods ‘consigned to a destination in the Republic or landed,
delivered or discharged in the Republic’.167 In respect of proceedings, section 2(1)(c)
provides that the STDA applies to:
‘any proceedings instituted in the Republic in any court or before any arbitration
tribunal after the commencement of this Act in respect of any sea transport
document or goods contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b), irrespective of whether
those proceedings relate to a cause of action arising before or after the
commencement of this Act.’
The intention of the South African legislature is clear. The STDA effectively applies to all
sea transport documents that are in issue with regard to matters in the Republic. Hare makes
the following comment:
‘The intention of this section 2(1)(c) is to bind the lex fori to the terms of the Bill,
thereby regulating both present and future cargo claims based upon all forms of
sea transport documents and in relation to all goods’.
In relation to the interplay between the STDA and the Hague-Visby Rules made applicable
by virtue of the SA COGSA ’86, the position is not as clearly ‘spelt’ as in English law (more
specifically section 5(5) of UK COGSA ’92). Although the STDA may supercede the SA
COGSA ’86 when it comes into force, it may do so arguably only to the extent that it does
not lessen the carrier’s minimum liability laid down in the Hague-Visby Rules.168
5.6 Application to Certain Other Sea Transport Documents
With the advent of containerization and other significant developments in the transport
industry in the last thirty plus years, the shipping industry has witnessed an increased usage in
alternative shipping documents such as the sea waybill and the non-negotiable receipt which
are often employed not only for their convenience in overcoming the delays caused by ‘slow’
bills of lading but because of their suitability to electronic communication.169 The extent and
manner in which the UK COGSA ’92 and the STDA deal with other forms of bills of lading
and sea transport documents shall be analysed in more detail below.
                                                
167 Section 2(1)(b) of the STDA.
168 See Hare, op cit at 524.
169 See Proctor, op cit at 83.
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5.6.1 Received for Shipment Bills of lading
A carrier will issue a 'received for shipment' bill of lading where the goods have been
received into its charge but have not yet been loaded on board.170 The manner in which
English law dealt with ‘received for shipment’ bills of lading in the past caused doubt as to
the applicability of the 1855 Act to such bills and whether valid title therein could be
transferred.171 For example, the Privy Council in The Marlborough Hill v Alex Cowen and
Sons Ltd172 interpreted the reference to ‘bill of lading’ in section 1 of the 1855 Act so as to
include a ‘received for shipment’ bill of lading.173 The contrary view was expressed in
Diamond Alkali Export Corp. v Fl Bourgeois174 where it was held that a ‘received for
shipment’ bill of lading, in the context of the international sale of goods, is not a bill of lading
for purposes of a CIF175 contract unless the contract expressly provides for a bill of lading in
that form.176
The Hague-Visby Rules do however make provision for a ‘received for shipment’ bill of
lading to be converted to a ‘shipped bill’ when the goods are loaded on board ship by giving
the shipper the right to demand that the date of actual shipment be noted on the bill.177
5.6.1.1 Section 2(1)(b) of UK COGSA 92
Section 2(1)(b) of UK COGSA ’92 dispels any doubt as to the transferability of a ‘received
for shipment’ bill of lading and specifically confirms that any reference to a bill of lading in
                                                
170 See further Tetley, op cit at 228; Proctor, op cit at 47; and Chuah Law of International Trade
Sweet & Maxwell, 1998 at 144.
171 Glass and Cashmore Introduction to the Law of Carriage of Goods Sweet & Maxwell, 1989 at par
5.39. See further Gaskell, Debattista and Swatton Chorley and Giles' Shipping Law 8th Edition
Pitman, 1988 at 251.
172 Marlborough Hill v Alex Cowen and Sons Ltd [1921] 1 AC 444.
173 A view preferred by Carver, op cit at para. 1613. See also Hare, op cit at 525 fn 222.
174 Diamond Alkali Export Corp. v Fl Bourgeois [1921] 3 KB 443. See further Halsbury’s, op cit at
par 1532, fn 3. See further Gaskell, Debattista and Swatton, op cit at 251.
175 Incoterm: Cost, Insurance and Freight. See Hare, op cit at 454.
176 See also Yelo v SM Machado & Co Ltd [1952] 1 Lloyd’s LR 183 where the court held that a
‘received for shipment’ bill of lading was not good tender under a FOB (‘Free on Board’) contract.
See Hare, op cit at 452.
177 Article III, Rule 4. See further Gaskell, Debattista and Swatton, op cit at 251; and Proctor, op cit
at 47.
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the Act includes references to ‘received for shipment’ bills of lading.178 The Law
Commissions sought to resolve the issue by confirming the status of container bills which
‘were all invariably in ‘received for shipment’ form’.179 In the circumstances, rights and
liabilities embodied in ‘received for shipment’ bills of lading are clearly transferable under
UK COGSA ’92.180
5.6.1.2 ‛Received for Shipment Bills of Lading under the STDA
The position of the ‘received for shipment’ bill of lading is less clear under the STDA than
under UK COGSA ’92. The STDA does not include a definition for the term ‘bill of
lading’.181 The STDA further does not specifically incorporate ‘received for shipment’ bills in
the term ‘bill of lading’ as done in UK COGSA ’92. The STDA does however make
reference to ‘received for shipment’ bills in section 6(a) which provides that a sea transport
document which ‘represents that goods ... have been received for shipment on board a vessel
... shall be prima facie evidence in favour of the holder of the document, who is the shipper ...
and conclusive evidence in favour of a subsequent holder’.
Current South African law would look to English law as at 1 November 1983 which includes
those decisions that cast doubt over the ability of rights in ‘received for shipment’ bills to be
transferred. However, in view of the reference to ‘received for shipment’ bills in section 6 as
well as the very wide definition of ‘sea transport document’ in section 1 of the STDA, it is
doubtful whether a ‘received for shipment’ bill would not be regarded as a sea transport
document for purposes of the STDA.182 The transferability of the rights in a ‘received for
shipment’ bill would arguably only be limited by section 2(2) of the STDA which makes the
                                                
178 See Halsbury’s, op cit at par 1560 fn 3. See further Reynolds, The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
1992 (1993) Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial L.Q. 436 at 443 where it is argued that the Hague-
Visby Rules do not attach to contracts where the goods have not been shipped at all.
179 Rights of Suit at 201.
180 See Gaskell, op cit at 140.
181 See Government Gazette Notice No. 18541 of 12 December 1997: Draft Sea Transport
Documents Bill – Invitation to Comment at par 30.1 in which it is stated that the phrase ‘bill of
lading’ was left indefined in the draft STDA on the basis that it has ‘an established meaning’ and
that any attempt at defining it ‘might obscure rather than clarify the position’.
182 Section 1 of the STDA defines a sea transport document as ‘(a) a bill of lading; (b) a through bill
of lading; (c) a combined transport bill of lading; (d) a sea waybill; or (e) any consignment note,
combined transport document or other similar document, relating to the carriage of goods either
wholly or partly by sea, irrespective of whether it is transferable or negotiable’.
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relevant transfer provisions of the Act applicable only to ‘transferable’ or negotiable’ sea
transport documents.
5.6.2 Ships Delivery Orders
Ship’s delivery orders are documents commonly used in the bulk cargo trade in instances
where consignments which are usually carried under one set of bills of lading are, with the
issue of such delivery orders, split and sold in parts to more than one buyer.183 A ship’s
delivery order may either be a document issued directly by or on behalf of the carrier whilst
the cargo is in its possession and which contains an undertaking that the cargo will be
delivered to the holder or to the order of a named person; or it may be a document issued by
the seller of the cargo to the carrier ordering the carrier to deliver to the order of a named
person (a so-called merchant’s delivery order) and there is attornment (acknowledgement) by
the carrier to that person.184 Ship’s delivery orders do not normally contain the terms of the
contract of carriage but often incorporate the terms of the relevant bill of lading.
5.6.2.1 Ship's Delivery Orders under UK COGSA '92
As already mentioned above,185 UK COGSA ’92 has extended rights of suit in respect of
ship’s delivery orders by virtue of section 2(1)(c).186 Section 1(4) of the Act defines a ship’s
delivery order as the following:
                                                
183 See Halsbury’s, op cit at par 1586; Rights of Suit at 201; Proctor, op cit at 74.
184 See Gaskell, op cit at 144; Halsbury’s, op cit at par 1586; Rights of Suit at 201.
185 See par 5.1.1.1 above.
186 Section 2(1)(c) provides that:
‘Subject to the following provisions of this section, a person who becomes –
... the person to whom delivery of the goods to which a ship’s delivery order relates is to
be made in accordance with the undertaking contained in the order, shall (... by virtue
of becoming the ... person to whom delivery is to be made) have transferred to and
vested in him all rights of suit under the contract of carriage as if he had been a party to
that contract’.
See further Gaskell, op cit at 144.
50
'References in this Act to a ship's delivery order are references to any document
which is neither a bill of lading nor a sea waybill but contains an undertaking
which-
(a) is given under or for the purposes of a contract for the carriage by sea
of the goods to which the document relates, or of goods which include
those goods; and
(b) is an undertaking by the carrier to a person identified in the document
to deliver the goods to which the document relates to that person'.
Prior to the enactment of UK COGSA ’92, buyers of parts of bulk cargo at sea went
unprotected due to the provisions of the English Sale of Goods Act, 1979, which did not
allow for the ownership of unascertainable goods to be transferred in contracts of sale unless
and until such time as the goods were ascertained.187 Difficulties with the wording of section
1 of the 1855 Act complicated matters further. Section 1 of the 1855 Act provided for the
transfer of rights of suit to consignees or indorsees of bills of lading ‘upon by reason of the
consignment or indorsement’ which could not occur in the case of parts of bulk cargo where
the goods were almost always ascertained at the port of discharge after the consignment or
indorsement.188 Section 2(1) of UK COGSA ’92 was therefore enacted to alleviate the
predicament of receivers of parts of bulk cargo.
The recipient under a ship’s delivery order is, under section 2(3), limited to asserting rights of
suit in respect of the goods described in the order and does not extend to other goods covered
by the underlying contract of carriage.189
The person entitled to delivery under a delivery order may also by virtue of section 3(2) incur
liabilities under the contract of carriage in the same way as the lawful holder of a bill of
lading, in other words, by taking or demanding delivery from the carrier but only in relation
to the goods described in the order.190 In the words of section 3(2), 'the liabilities … shall
exclude liabilities in respect of any goods to which the order does not relate'. Similar to a bill
of lading holder, the person identified in the delivery order may 'become subject to the same
liabilities under that contract as if he had been a party to the contract of carriage'.191
                                                
187 See Rights of Suit at 196.
188 See Rights of Suit at 196.
189 See Rights of Suit at 204.
190 See Gaskell, op cit at 144. See also Rights of Suit at 206.
191 See Gaskell, op cit at 145.
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Gaskell warns that care must be taken in drafting ship’s delivery orders as a merchant’s
delivery order cannot pass rights of suit unless there is attornment by the carrier.192
5.6.2.2 Ship's Delivery Orders under the STDA
Although section 1 of the STDA appears to include quite a number of documents in the list of
sea transport documents, no express mention is made of a ship’s delivery order.193 It is
arguable that a ship’s delivery order may constitute a ‘similar document relating to the
carriage of goods either wholly or partly by sea’ under section 1(e), in which case the transfer
of rights provisions of the STDA will be applicable to the extent that they are not excluded by
section 2(2) which requires the sea transport document to be ‘transferable or negotiable’ in
order for those provisions to apply.
However, in terms of the South African Roman Dutch law principle of commixtio, where two
solids are mixed together to the extent that they are indistinguishable from one another, the
buyers become joint owners of the whole bulk provided that the mixing took place with their
consent.194 In the absence of consent, there is no transfer of ownership from the seller but the
buyer may vindicate that portion of the mixture which is proportionate to his contribution or
purchase price paid.195 In Andrews v Rosenbaum & Co196 the court held the following:
‘The case ... is similar to that mentioned by Voet (6.1.27), where articles
belonging to two different owners have become mixed together, so that it is
either impossible or difficult to identify and separate them again. Here the owner
retains his right, where he can vindicate a definite and given portion of such
mixed articles, and even an uncertain part when he is justly ignorant of the share
actually belonging to him. Voet refers in support of this to the Digest (6.1, ll3, 4
and 5), and to the familiar passage in the Institutes (2.1.28), where it is laid down
that if the wheat of two persons is mixed with their consent, the mixed wheat
becomes their common property; but if the wheat of two persons becomes mixed
together by accident, or by one of them without the consent of the other, then the
                                                
192 See Gaskell, op cit at 144. And, Halsbury’s, op cit at 1586.
193 Section 1 of the STDA provides that a ‘sea transport document’ means (a) a bill of lading; (b) a
through bill of lading’; (c) a combined transport bill of lading; (d) a sea waybill; or (e) any
consignment note, combined transport document or other similar document, relating to the
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194 See Kleyn and Boraine, op cit at 222; Sonnekus and Neels, op cit at 302.
195 See Kleyn and Boraine, op cit at 222; Sonnekus and Neels, op cit at 302.
196 Andrews v Rosenbaum & Co 1908 EDC 419.
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mixed wheat is not common property, any more than a herd would be, where the
cattle of two persons have become mixed together. If under the circumstances
one of the two persons retains the whole of the mixed wheat, the other will have
a real action for the recovery of the amount of wheat belonging to him. It shall be
left to the discretion of the judge to determine and estimate the value of the wheat
which belonged to each’.197
The position under the South African common law is therefore similar to the position under
the English law prior to the enactment of the UK COGSA ’92; ie. when the provisions of the
Sale of Goods Act, 1979, and the 1855 Act applied. In the circumstances and without express
statutory provision providing otherwise, it does not appear that the rights of suit in ship’s
delivery orders are transferable under the STDA as is the case under UK COGSA ’92.
5.6.3 Sea Waybills
The sea waybill is particularly useful in container transport where sea voyages are relatively
short and a document of title is unnecessary either to secure payment or to sell the goods in
transit.198 The carrier is ordered to deliver the goods to a named consignee who needs only to
identify himself at the port of discharge in order to obtain delivery of the goods. It is therefore
not necessary to transmit the sea waybill to the port of discharge. A sea waybill is evidence of
the contract of carriage and functions as a receipt for the goods described in it but is not a
document of title and as such is not a bill of lading.199
One of the difficulties experienced in utilizing sea waybills is that the international liability
regimes of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules do not apply to contracts of carriage which are
not evidenced by bills of lading.200 It is therefore possible for shipments under sea waybills
not to fall under the mandatory application of the liability regimes and as such may exist in a
                                                
197 Andrews v Rosenbaum & Co 1908 EDC 419 at 425. See also The Areti L 1986 (2) SA 446 (C)
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‘legislative vacuum, with no uniformity’.201 The Comité Maritime International (CMI)202
therefore, in an attempt to fill this gap, introduced the Uniform Rules for Sea Waybills which
apply 'when adopted by a contract of carriage which is not covered by a bill of lading or
similar document or title, whether the contract be in writing or not'.203 The Uniform Rules
provide for uniformity in the procedures and liabilities arising from the use of sea waybills
and further, deal with the issue of transfer of rights from the shipper to the part identified in
the sea waybill.204 They are intended to be incorporated voluntarily into contracts of carriage
evidenced by sea waybills.205
5.6.3.1 Relevant Provisions of UK COGSA 92
Motivated by the general increase in the usage of sea waybills in container transport and in
anticipation of future problems, the Law Commissions sought to make UK COGSA ’92
applicable to sea waybills. More particularly, to enable the consignee named in a sea waybill
to sue on the contract of carriage without prejudice to the rights of the shipper.206 In the words
of the Law Commissions,
‘The waybill is a typical case of a contract for the benefit of a third party and thus
suffers from the familiar problem that the person who has suffered loss (the
consignee) is unable to sue the person responsible for the damage (the carrier),
whereas the person who is able to sue (the shipper) has suffered no loss, has no
reason to sue and may in any event be unable to recover substantial damages.
Hence, including sea waybills in the Bill is a further, commercially desirable,
inroad into the doctrine of privity of contract’.207
By virtue of section 1(1)(b), UK COGSA ’92 therefore applies to ‘any sea waybill’. Section
1(3) defines a sea waybill as any document which is not a bill of lading but -
‘(a) is such a receipt for goods as contains or evidences a contract for the
carriage of goods by sea; and
                                                
201 See Hare, op cit at 447.
202 The CMI is a non-governmental international organisation which strives towards 'the unification
of maritime law in all aspects'.
203 See Hare, op cit at 568 fn 122.
204 See Hare, op cit at 447.
205 See Hare, op cit at 447.
206 See Rights of Suit at 199 - 200.
207 See Rights of Suit at 201.
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(b) identifies the person to whom delivery of the goods is to be made by the
carrier in accordance with that contract’.
More relevant to the plight of the sea waybill consignee is section 2(1)(b) which provides that
a person:
‘who becomes the person who (without being an original party to the contract of
carriage) is the person to whom delivery of the goods to which a sea waybill
relates is to be made by the carrier in accordance with that contract ... shall (by
virtue of becoming ... the person to whom delivery is to be made) have
transferred to and vested in him all rights of suit under the contract of carriage as
if he had been a party to that contract’.
The Act treats sea waybills differently to bills of lading. Firstly, the Law Commissions
created a different mechanism for the transfer of rights of suit under a sea waybill than that
adopted for bills of lading due to the very nature of the sea waybill being non-transferable.208
By virtue of section 2(1)(b), rights of suit under a sea waybill are transferred to the consignee
identified in the sea waybill unlike the position of the bill of lading consignee who acquires
rights by virtue of it being the lawful holder of the bill of lading. Secondly, section 2(5)
provides that rights acquired under section 2(1) operate without prejudice to the rights of the
sea waybill shipper. This is also contrary to the position of the bill of lading shipper whose
rights, by virtue of the same sub-section, are extinguished upon transfer.209
Gaskell is of the opinion that the acquisition of rights by a sea waybill consignee under
section 2(1)(b) is dependant upon the rights of the shipper to, for example, vary delivery
instructions to the carrier.210 The writer’s opinion is motivated by the use the words ‘delivery
of the goods ... in accordance with the contract’ which seem to suggest that delivery as
opposed to the fact that a person is named as a consignee in the sea waybill is the decisive
factor. Furthermore, the use of the words ‘is the person to whom delivery ... is to be made’, in
future tense, indicate that the rights must be capable of acquisition before delivery. The writer
illustrates this by way of the following example. The shipper under a sea waybill may, whilst
the goods are in transit and regardless of the fact that the sea waybill identifies X as the
                                                
208 See Garkell, op cit at 142. See The Chitral [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 529 where it was held that a bill
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209 See Gaskell, op cit at 142. See further Law Com. No. 196, Notes of Partial Dissent to Rights of
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consignee, instruct the carrier to make delivery to Y in which case X would not acquire any
rights of suit, and Y would, despite not being named in the sea waybill.211 Section 5(3) of the
Act in any event provides as follows:
‘References in this Act to a person’s being identified in a document include
reference to his being identified by a description which allows for the identity
of the person in question to be varied in accordance with the terms of the
document, after its issue; and the reference in section 1(3)(b) of this Act to a
document’s identifying a person shall be construed accordingly’.
As a result of this subsection, the appearance of the word ‘identifies’ in section 1(3)(b)
effectively means that the sea waybill consignee can include a person who is not originally
named in the sea waybill but who is later identified as the consignee.
The consignees of both sea waybills and bills of lading are treated similarly under section 3.
In terms of section 3(1), a sea waybill consignee vested with rights under section 2 who
demands delivery or makes a claim under the contract of carriage shall, like a bill of lading
consignee, ‘become subject to the same liabilities under the contract as if he had been a party
to that contract’.212 As with bills, section 3(3) does not affect the liability of the shipper under
sea waybills.213
Regarding representations made in sea waybills, the conclusive evidence provisions of
section 4 are drafted in favour of bills of lading holders only with the result that
representations made in sea waybills are only prima facie evidence against the carrier.214 The
Law Commissions were reluctant to widen the application of section 4 to other documents
such as the sea waybill on grounds of them having no mandate to extend Article III Rule 4 of
the Hague-Visby Rules.215 More specifically, section 1(6)(b) of UK COGSA ’71 which
provides for the application of the Hague-Visby Rules to non-negotiable documents, also
provides for the modification of Article III Rule 4 by deleting the second sentence which
embodies the conclusive evidence provision.216
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5.6.3.2 Relevant Provisions of the STDA
There is a clear distinction between the STDA and UK COGSA ’92 in the manner in which
Acts approach sea waybills. Section 2(1) of the STDA provides for the application of the Act
‘to any sea transport document issued in the Republic’. Section 1 defines a ‘sea transport
document’ so as to include a sea waybill. However, section 2(2) of the STDA specifically
provides that
‘sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 apply only to sea transport documents that are
transferable or negotiable, and any reference in those sections to a sea transport
document must be construed accordingly’.
A sea waybill by definition is neither negotiable nor transferable. The party identified in a sea
waybill acquires no rights or obligations in terms of STDA. Sections 1, 2, 7,8 and 9 which
deal with definitions, general applicability of the STDA, delivery, persons acting in bad faith
and the making of subsequent regulations, respectively, apply to sea waybills. At best, the
representations in the sea waybill are prima facie evidence of the shipment of the goods by
virtue of the provisions of SA COGSA ’86.217
5.6.4 Electronic Bills of Lading and Other Sea Transport Documents
Commercial shipping has for centuries operated successfully on the basis of the physical
exchange of paper bills of lading. The practical transfer of the bill of lading from shipper to
receiver of cargo worked well during times of long sea voyages. However, the advent of
containerization, general improvements in transport technology and the speed at which cargo
is delivered today has rendered the use of a tangible bill of lading problematic in view of the
modern reality of goods arriving at their discharge ports way before the bills of lading.218
Increasingly, carriers are releasing goods to alleged cargo receivers without production of the
original bills of lading against the security of letters of indemnity.219 This practice undermines
                                                
217 See discussion under par 5.4.2 above.
218 See Humphries & Higgs An Overview of the Implications of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
1992 (1993) J. of Business Law 61 at 64; See further Proctor, op cit at xiv and 146; and Hare, op
cit at 467. See further Faber Electronic Bills of Lading  (1996) Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial
L.Q 232.
219 See Proctor, op cit at 146.
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the very purpose for which bills of lading were first used; ie. the convenience of their
physical transferability.220 In an effort to speed up the documentary process and to avoid the
payment of high demurrage costs, merchants are making more and more use of alternative
transport documents, like sea waybills and ship’s delivery orders, and modern electronic
communication methods such as electronic data interchange (EDI) to facilitate the
transmission of such documents.221 Paperless international transactions are becoming
increasingly common. Attempts at replacing the hard copy bill of lading with an electronic
alternative and being able to negotiate it electronically challenges the traditional principles of
contract formation which is why legislators are hard at work adapting the law in order to
adequately deal with these recent commercial developments.222
In 1990, the CMI agreed the Rules for Electronic Bills of Lading - a set of voluntary rules
which, in basic terms, operate on the basis of the shipper giving irrevocable instructions to the
carrier to hold goods for a named consignee who, without production of a document,
becomes entitled to receive the goods solely by virtue of the instruction.223 These Rules make
provision for successive transfers while the goods are still in transit and security is achieved
by way of a ‘private key’ which puts the 'holder' in the same position as if it had possession
of original bills of lading.224
On 16 December 1996, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) produced a 'Model Law on Electronic Commerce with a Guide to Enactment'
for the purpose of offering national legislators of trading nations:
'a set of internationally acceptable rules as to how a number of legal obstacles
may be removed, and how a more secure legal environment may be created for
what has become known as "electronic commerce". The principles expressed in
the Model Law are also intended to be of use to individual users of electronic
commerce in the drafting of some of the contractual solutions that might be
                                                
220 See Proctor, op cit at 146.
221 See Hare, op cit at 467 and 564; Humphries & Higgs, An Overview of the Implications of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (1993) J. of Business Law 61 at 64; Proctor, op cit at 146;
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222 See Siegfried Eiselen Electronic Commerce and the UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 1980 available on the following website:
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needed to overcome the legal obstacles to the increased use of electronic
commerce.'225
The Model Law has no direct application but serves to provide a framework for national laws
on legal aspects of EDI. It therefore has no direct effect on the application of international
carriage conventions.226 A number of countries have however based their domestic legislation
on the Model Law for example Australia, Singapore and Bermuda. The extent to which both
English and South African law cater for modern methods of transferring sea transport
documents shall be analysed in more detail below.
5.6.4.1 Section 1(5) and (6) of UK COGSA 92
In terms of section 1(5) of UK COGSA '92, the Secretary of State may by way of regulations
make provision for the application of the Act to cases where a telecommunication system or
any other information technology is used for effecting transactions corresponding to:
'(1) the issue of a document to which the 1992 Act applies,
 (2) the indorsement, delivery or other transfer of such a document; or
 (3) the doing of anything else in relation to such a document'.227
Following on from section 1(5), section 1(6) empowers the Secretary of State to make such
modifications to the Act in this regard as it deems appropriate.228
In light of the increased usage of sea waybills and paperless transactions, the Law
Commissions thought it would be 'commercially desirable' to make provision for the enabling
legislation in order not to limit the Act by 'the state of the art' at the time of the enactment.229
It appears however that no regulations have as yet been issued.230 Despite this, Gaskell still
believes the provisions of UK COGSA '92 will apply in instances where an electronic bill of
lading is used.231
                                                
225 See Hare, op cit at 468.
226 See Gaskell, op cit at 24.
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According to English law, most contracts do not need to be writing in order to be enforceable.
Traditional forms of record keeping such as paper and the requirement of a signature have
however caused most states to develop their laws around paper-based transactions. English
legislation similarly makes countless reference to writing and signature.232 An important
development in English law is section 7 of the United Kingdom Electronic Communications
Act 2000 (c. 7),233 which allows for electronic signatures to be admissible in evidence without
any presumption as to their validity.234 In terms of section 8 of this Act, the appropriate
Minister may modify the provisions of existing legislation, which presumably includes UK
COGSA ’92, for a number of purposes (listed in subsection (2)) designed for authorising or
facilitating the use of electronic communications or electronic storage. For an example of
such a purpose, section 2(a) provides for ‘the doing of anything which under any such
provisions is required to be or may be done or evidenced in writing or otherwise using a
document, notice or instrument’. Gaskell believes that section 8 is wide enough to allow for
the modifications of UK COGSA ’71 so as to apply the Hague-Visby Rules to electronic bills
of lading.235
5.6.4.2 Section 9 of the STDA: Regulations
Section 9 of the STDA similarly empowers the Minister of Transport to make regulations:
'prescribing the circumstances in which and the conditions subject to which
a record or document produced by a telecommunication system or an
electronic or other information technology system, and effecting
transactions such as those effected by any sea transport document, is to be
regarded as a sea transport document'.236
This provision contemplates the making of future regulations for electronic commerce in
general which may be based on regimes such as the Model Law or the CMI Rules for
                                                                                                                                                
231 See Gaskell, op cit at 27.
232 See Gaskell, op cit at 27 where mention is made of an estimate that there are over 40 000 statutory
references to writing and signature.
233 The Electronic Communications Act, 2000, received Royal Assent on 25 May 2000.
234 See Gaskell, op cit at 27
235 See Gaskell, op cit at 27.
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Electronic Bills of Lading.237 However, until the STDA comes into force, regard must be had
to current South African law in this regard.
Under South African law, an agreement need not necessarily be in writing in order to be valid
and enforceable, as is the case under English law. The South African legal system similarly
also developed its laws around paper-based transactions. The ‘best evidence’ rule of South
African law of evidence which requires the original of a document to be produced, is one
such example. The law of evidence is in South African law the only area in which computer-
specific legislation has been adopted in the form of an entire statute.238 The Computer
Evidence Act, No. 57 of 1983, was enacted to provide for the admissibility in civil
proceedings of evidence generated by computers.239 Section 1(1) defines a ‘computer print-
out’ as:
‘the documentary form in which information240 is produced by a computer or a
copy or reproduction of it, and includes, whenever any information needs to be
transcribed, translated or interpreted after its production by the computer in order
that it may take documentary form and be intelligible to the court, a transcription,
translation or interpretation of which is calculated to have that effect’.241
Similar to the wording of the English Interpretation Act of 1978, section 3 of the South
African Interpretation Act, No 33 of 1957, provides the following interpretation in respect of
expressions relating to ‘writing’:
‘In every law expressions relating to writing shall, unless the contrary intention
appears, be construed as including also references to typewriting, lithography,
photography and all other modes of representing or reproducing words in visible
form’.
                                                
237 See Hare, op cit at 526 and 570.
238 LAWSA Vol 5(3) par 13, more particularly footnote 1 thereof which provides the ‘certain statutes
have been amended in part to deal with computers: see eg the Copyright Act 98 of 1978’.
239 The Computer Evidence Act was enacted in response to the decision in Narlis v SA Bank of Athens
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computerized records to indicate that the respondent had an overdraft with the bank. See LAWSA
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In view of the above, it is unclear whether any reference to a ‘bill of lading or other similar
document of title’ in the Hague-Visby Rules or in the STDA for that matter falls within this
interpretation of ‘writing’.242 Although section 3 has never been amended since the
Interpretation Act came into force, it is unlikely that this section would not apply to computer
print-outs as a ‘mode of representing or reproducing words in visible form’. Hare suggests
that section 3 should, in the interests of certainty, be amended so as to include specific
reference to computer data.243
Despite the fact that the STDA does not have force of law yet, Hare believes that:
‘South African law even at this stage ... would be able to give judicial recognition
and enforcement to such exchanges by way of computer print-outs as evidence.
For even the most complex coded data exchange leaves a footprint which can be
extracted and printed out for expert interpretation’.244
The South African parliament was recently presented with a Green Paper on Electronic
Commerce with a view to developing a policy framework for electronic commerce.245
Amongst the vast number of issues raised in the paper, Chapter 3, which is based upon the
Model Law, deals with ‘matters directly affecting the legality and enforceability of
commercial transactions’. Attention is drawn to the need for legal recognition of electronic
communications and the drawing up of legislation that recognises the validity and
enforceability of contracts formed by way of electronic communication as well as the need
for legislation which provides clear guidelines as to the admissibility and evidential weight of
electronic records. However, Hare makes the comment that until legislation is enacted to
recognise electronic interchanges, ‘it is up to the parties to agree terms voluntarily to
empower themselves’.246
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5.7. Miscellaneous Provisions
5.7.1 Delivery in terms of the STDA
Delivery is treated differently under STDA. It functions to absolve the carrier of his
obligations if done correctly. Under the UK COGSA ’92, it serves to impose the same
obligations under the contract of carriage on the holder of the bill of lading, where it takes or
demand delivery of the goods to which the document relates.247
Section 7 of the STDA, at first glance, seems to deal with the right of a carrier to be regarded
as having performed its obligations under the contract of carriage. More specifically, section
7(1) provides that the carrier ‘is discharged from the obligation to deliver if that carrier makes
delivery ... to the person entitled to such delivery in terms of subsection (2)’.
Following on, section 7(2) provides that he who presents the sea transport document to the
carrier shall be entitled to delivery of the goods only in accordance with the contract and on
the terms contained therein and, ‘subject to subsection (3)’, if that person is the first person
presenting the document.
Section 7(3) provides that the carrier may require the person presenting the sea transport
document to establish his right to delivery which person may do so either by application to
court or by any other means acceptable to the carrier. The latter instance will however be at
the carrier’s risk and the carrier may require an indemnity in order to protect itself from the
claims of the person lawfully entitled to delivery.
Finally, section 7(4) provides that unless the court on an application contemplated in
subsection (3) orders otherwise, delivery made in terms of section 7 does not affect any right
to damages. Hare makes the following comment in this regard:
'The section would appear therefore to give protection to the carrier on the one
hand, but to take it away on the other, unless the carrier has been prudent enough
to apply to court for an order authorising delivery’.248
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The wording of subsection 4 is somewhat unclear for it would defeat the objectives of any
commercial shipping line which strives to maximise its efficiency and cargo turn around time
to insist that consignees turn to the courts in order to prove their right to delivery.
Commercial liners operate a business. The use of letters of indemnity are common practice
when bills fail to arrive on time. It is unlikely that carriers will insist that consignees or
transferees demanding delivery should first approach the courts in order to do so.
Section 8(1)(b) provides that the carrier shall not be entitled to any defence or be discharged
from any obligation if at the time of making delivery it ‘knew or had reasonable grounds for
believing that the person to whom delivery was made had no right to receive delivery’.249 The
onus would therefore be on the claimant to prove mala fides on the part of the carrier, as
confirmed by section 8(2) of the STDA.250
6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have seen how the two Acts which were originally drafted for
fundamentally the same purpose, ie. to update the law on title to sue, can in their own
respective ways be quite distinct on a number of issues.251 The UK COGSA ’92 allows for
contractual rights of suit to be transferred in documents such as sea waybills and ship’s
delivery orders. The STDA does not provide for the transfer of rights in sea waybills by
virtue of such documents being non-transferable and is unclear in its application to ship's
delivery orders. The UK COGSA ’92 arguably provides more clarity in respect of the rights
of interim holders of eg bills of lading, unlike the STDA which makes no direct reference
interim holders. UK COGSA '92, in separating the transfer of rights from liabilities, appears
to protect pledgee banks and other institutions holding bills of lading as security against
claims by the carrier in instances where they have no intention of dealing with the goods. No
such protection is afforded by the STDA which provides for the simultaneous transfer of
rights and liabilities. The UK COGSA '92 is overall a more comprehensive piece of
legislation and to a large extent provides more clarity on a number of issues. Despite this, it
                                                
249 See also discussion under par 5.3.2.
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can be said with confidence that the provisions of the STDA have improved on current South
African law in respect of title to sue and any attempt at striving for legal certainty must be
applauded. Both Acts are clearly welcomed and will no doubt give warm comfort (to a
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